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Marriage Equality and a Lawyer’s Role in the 
Emergence of “New” Rights 
 
Daniel J. Canon* 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 In 2015, the author was fortunate enough to 
represent six couples and their children before the United 
States Supreme Court in two Kentucky cases styled Love 
v. Beshear and Bourke v. Beshear,1 which are now better 
known by their consolidated name: Obergefell v. Hodges.2 
When the case was accepted by the high Court, a handful 
of day-to-day civil litigators were drawn into a different 
world—one few lawyers get to see. Even lawyers who 
regularly practice at the Supreme Court do not often see 
the kind of concerted effort witnessed by the advocates in 
Obergefell. It was the culmination of decades of work by 
countless activists, scholars, organizations, and lawyers. 
And all that effort was in order to create what amounted 
to a new right.3  
                                               
* Visiting professor, University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of Law. 
The author has been a practicing litigator for the past decade and has 
represented clients in several high-profile and/or seminal cases in the area of 
civil rights. See, e.g., Nwanguma v. Trump, 273 F. Supp. 3d 719 (W.D. Ky. 
2017); Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. 2015); Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 192 L. Ed. 2d 609 (2015); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 
(W.D. Ky. 2014). The author is grateful to Dr. Joanne Sweeny for helpful 
guidance on this project and research assistants Irina Strelkova and Aleisha 
Cowles for their excellent work. 
1 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014); 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014). 
2 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
3 Whether or not the right is “new” depends on who is asked, and how you 
define the scope of the right. The legal fiction that the right to same-sex 
marriage existed in 1878, but had not quite been discovered yet, was a 
critical argument to some proponents of marriage equality, and indeed is 
discussed in no uncertain terms by the District Court in Bourke v. Beshear, 
discussed at length infra. (“For many others, this decision could raise basic 
questions about our Constitution. For instance, are courts creating new 
rights? Are judges changing the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment or 
our Constitution? Why is all this happening so suddenly? The answer is that 
the right to equal protection of the laws is not new. History has already 
shown us that, while the Constitution itself does not change, our 
understanding of the meaning of its protections and structure evolves. If this 
were not so, many practices that we now abhor would still exist.”) Bourke, 
996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 556 (W.D. Ky. 2014), rev'd sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev'd sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2015) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Had those 
who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or 
the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold 
possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to 
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In 1970, two men from Minnesota tried to get a 
marriage license. They took their case all the way to the 
Supreme Court, too. But in a sharp contrast with Justice 
Kennedy’s grandiose, 28-page opinion in Obergefell, the 
holding of Baker v. Nelson contained but one sentence: 
“The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
question.”4 In other words, a right to same-sex marriage 
under the Constitution was not an idea the Court was 
willing to entertain, even as a threshold issue. What 
happened between 1970 and 2015 to catapult an assertion 
of a right thought of as a fringe idea worth only one 
dismissive sentence to a full-fledged, constitutional right? 
And how can practitioners replicate that success on behalf 
of clients who seek changes in the law, including the 
recognition of “new” rights?  
This Article seeks to begin the process of answering 
those questions. To do so, the Article uses the example of 
the Obergefell litigation, and changes in social 
circumstances between Baker and Obergefell, to provide a 
working conceptual model to be used by lawyers seeking 
to aid in bringing new rights into being. Part II discusses 
the development of same-sex marriage in the context of 
the historical concept of rights overall. In Part III, this 
Article posits a model of rights as existing in three 
different stages. Part IV explores a number of identifiable 
factors that advance rights through those three different 
stages. Part V discusses, in a practical and historical 
sense, how the concepts identified in the previous sections 
came into play in establishing marriage equality as a 
right. Part VI briefly deals with the issue of caution and 
incrementalism vis-à-vis the role of the practitioner in 
litigating a client’s rights. And the final section discusses 
ways a practitioner can use these concepts to further civil 
and human rights in her own practice.  
                                               
have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later 
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve 
only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can 
invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”)). No doubt this 
argument resonated with originalists struggling to square a uniquely twenty-
first century idea with an eighteenth century document. And there are still 
others who would prefer not to think of the right to same-sex marriage as 
distinct from the right to marriage overall. But in the broad context of human 
history, the idea that two persons of the same biological sex could possess a 
right to be married is undeniably novel, and that is the assumption from 
which this article proceeds. 
4 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972).  
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I.  SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AS A RIGHT 
 
A. What is a right? 
 
At the outset, it is useful to discuss briefly what is 
meant by a “right” in this context. From a strictly 
academic perspective, there is no widespread agreement 
as to what a “right” is, or where rights come from.5 For 
our purposes, it is less important to specifically define 
these terms than it is to conduct a gross observation of 
how they operate.  
First, let us dispense with the idea that any rights 
are fixed, at least from a legal standpoint. Indeed, the 
entire concept of individual rights did not exist in any sort 
of cognizable form until the last couple of centuries or so; 
ancient languages did not even have a word that meant 
“rights.”6 Legal theorist Edward L. Rubin discusses the 
origin of property “rights” as coming from English 
philosopher and theologian William of Ockham.7 Though 
laws regarding ownership of property were common in the 
Middle Ages, the concept of an inherent “right” to 
property was not. Ockham’s “general position was that 
human beings possess an inherent right to use material 
objects and an inherent liberty that can perhaps be 
regarded as a right. They then establish, by means of 
human law, systems of property rights and political 
rights.”8 Thus, according to Ockham and those that 
followed his reasoning, property rights were what we 
might call “natural rights.” 
Critical for our purposes, “natural rights can be 
asserted by individuals against political authorities.”9 For 
example, Hobbes posited an early, natural right of self-
preservation, which meant (among other things) that 
“subjects cannot be ordered to kill themselves, although 
they may be executed.”10 As such, most early “rights” were 
kept separate and apart from the few natural rights that 
                                               
5 For an extensive, scholarly discussion of the origin of human rights, see 
Edward L. Rubin, Rethinking Human Rights, 9 INT’L. LEGAL THEORY 5, 8–9 
(2003).  
6 JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 
2013). 
7 Rubin, supra note 5, at 13–14. 
8 Id. at 16. 
9 Id. at 17. 
10 Id. at 22. 
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people could assert as against their own government.11 
“[A]lmost all the protections against government that we 
currently associate with human rights were products of 
social movements that were unrelated to natural rights 
theory.”12  
In Rubin’s view, in the late eighteenth century, this 
began to change.  
 
[T]he natural rights conception was losing its 
force and revealing government as a purely 
human and potentially unconstrained creation. 
Under those circumstances, it was reassuring 
to describe the protection that they championed 
as rights, rights that were related to the 
natural rights that people possessed in their 
presocial condition. It became possible to 
envision a right to speak, to worship freely, to 
be free of slavery or torture, and to be tried by 
due process of law. Such rights, like natural 
rights, could be conceived as possessions, 
borrowing, by virtue of their form, the 
sacerdotal quality of their God-given 
predecessors. Like natural rights, these 
possessions existed independently of 
government, and controlled the government’s 
proper relationship to individuals.13 
 
In other words, social movements co-opted the label of 
“rights” generally from the idea of “natural rights,” and 
began to apply that label to things that were pragmatic 
social needs. Of course, specific information on how those 
needs came to be widely recognized as rights by societies 
during and before the eighteenth century is sparse. But 
the point is that the longstanding moral authority of a 
“natural right” was purposefully harnessed and used by 
social movements to control the behavior of the state and 
to facilitate the wishes of a group of people who might 
otherwise lack the political power to vindicate those 
wishes.14   
                                               
11 Id. at 47. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 49–50. 
14 See DONNELLY, supra note 6, at 11–12. 
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As a result, a “right” as we understand it in twenty-
first century America is a social trump card; it allows for 
the assertion that a power structure must do something 
that it would not otherwise do in order to accommodate an 
individual.15 As one scholar puts it, rights are “moral 
demands on government.”16 So, by definition, power 
structures do not recognize rights at their inception. To 
the contrary, this initial stage is often marked by apathy, 
scorn, or ridicule by the majority and, by extension, 
governmental and other institutions that reflect the 
majority view (or “political authorities,” to use Rubin’s 
nomenclature).17 Even those rights one might consider 
most basic today were, at best, luxuries to previous 
generations, not at all within the purview of government 
action or non-action.18  
But now, by and large, people the world over have 
figured out the power of asserting something as a “right” 
and not merely a desire as a means of managing the 
behavior of governing institutions. As a result, rights are 
born at an ever-increasing frequency. Today’s wishes are 
tomorrow’s fervent hopes and the next day’s god-given 
rights. Contemporary examples abound. In 2016, the 
United Nations “declared that ‘online freedom’ is a 
‘human right,’ and one that must be protected.”19 The 
Right to Try Act of 2017, which became federal law in May 
2018, provides patients with an affirmative right to 
“obtain investigational drugs outside of clinical trials.”20 
Advances in neurotechnology have led to calls for the 
                                               
15 Id. at 7–8; see also Neil Stammers, Social Movements and the Social 
Construction of Human Rights, 21 JOHNS HOPKINS U. PRESS, HUM. RTS. Q. 
980, 982–983 (1999), http://www.jstor.org/stable/762754.  
16 Rubin, supra note 5, at 66. 
17 “First they ignore you. Then they ridicule you. And they attack you and 
want to burn you. And then they build monuments to you.” Nicholas Klein, 
Address During a Biennial Convention of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of 
America (May 15, 1918) (speaking about that union).  
18 See Rubin, supra note 5, at 34–45 (discussing the abolition of slavery, the 
abolition of torture, and the birth of due process rights).  
19 Tim Sandle, UN Thinks Internet Access as a Human Right, BUS. INSIDER 
(Jul. 22, 2016, 11:57 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/un-says-internet-
access-is-a-human-right-2016-7; see also, e.g., What is the Human Right to 
Housing?, NAT’L ECON. & SOC. RTS. INITIATIVE, 
https://www.nesri.org/programs/what-is-the-human-right-to-housing (last 
visited May 11, 2018); Jimmy Tobias, Meet the Rising New Housing 
Movement That Wants to Create Homes for All, NATION (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-way-home/. 
20 Kate Traynor, Federal Right-to-try Law Aims to Broaden Access to 
Investigational Drugs, AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 1085, 1085 (2018), 
http://www.ajhp.org/content/75/15/1085?sso-checked=true.  
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“creation of new rights to protect people from potential 
harm[,]” such as the right to “mental privacy” and the 
right to “psychological continuity.”21 Rights such as these, 
in various stages of recognition, and concerning just about 
any topic, can be readily observed. Most of these are not 
“natural” rights in any realistic sense, and it is difficult to 
see how it is a derivative of any natural right in the 
Hobbesian sense. 
 
B.  The History of Marriage as a Right 
 
As part of making a case to the Supreme Court as 
to why the right to same-sex marriage should exist, the 
Obergefell litigators had to learn the history of the 
assertion of that right, at least in a judicial context, in 
order to explain to the Court why government should 
conform its conduct to that assertion now when it had 
never done so before. There was not much to know. When 
Richard Baker and James McConnell applied for a 
marriage license in Minnesota in 1970, people laughed. 
Eventually, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a curt 
and cursory rebuke of their legal arguments.22 And a year 
later, the Supreme Court summarily discarded the idea of 
same-sex marriage as a right altogether.23 This was the 
same Court that just a half-decade before had 
unanimously affirmed a right to interracial marriage—an 
idea which was ridiculed throughout most of America’s 
history,24 but by 1967 “reflect[ed] the central meaning” of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.25 In the succeeding years, 
                                               
21 Marcello Ienca & Roberto Andorno, Towards New Human Rights in the Age 
of Neuroscience and Neurotechnology, LIFE SCI., SOC’Y AND POL’Y 2 (Apr. 26, 
2017), https://lsspjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40504-017-
0050-1. 
22 See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971). 
23 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
24 Peggy Pascoe, Why the Ugly Rhetoric Against Gay Marriage is Familiar to 
this Historian of Miscegenation, COLUMBIAN C. OF ARTS & SCI. AT THE GEO. 
WASH. U. (Apr. 19, 2004) https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/4708.  
25 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967); compare the recounting of the 
congressional debates over what eventually became the Fourteenth 
Amendment contained in R.C. Pittman, The Fourteenth Amendment: Its 
Intended Effect on Anti-Miscegenation Laws, 43 N.C. L. REV. 92, 94–95 (1964) 
(“Senator Lyman Trumbull, who had introduced the Bill and was its 
manager, made it clear that there was no intention to nullify the anti-
miscegenation statutes or constitutional requirements of the various states . . 
. . On that point he said: . . . . ‘Are not both races treated alike by the law of 
Indiana? Does not the law make it just as much a crime for a white man to 
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the Court affirmed the fundamental marriage rights of 
prisoners and parents who were behind on support 
payments.26 
Shortly after the fundamental right to marriage 
was firmly established by this series of cases in the 
United States Supreme Court, individual states began to 
contemplate same-sex marriage in earnest. In 1993, in a 
case called Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
intimated that someday, maybe same-sex marriage could 
be possible.27 Then, in 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health said 
that marriage was a right to be enjoyed by couples within 
the state.28 At the same time, the right to sexual intimacy 
between adults, regardless of sex, emerged in the United 
States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Lawrence v. 
Texas.29 And in 2013, in United States v. Windsor, Justice 
Kennedy called the right to same-sex marriage, as 
conferred by certain states, “a dignity and status of 
immense import,” hinting that the country might be at a 
tipping point.30 It was. And the tipping was realized by 
Obergefell.  
However, the stark difference between Obergefell 
and Baker cannot be explained solely by reference to case 
law, or even the combination of jurisprudential changes 
and a few successful ballot initiatives. As legal scholar 
and ACLU National Legal Director, David Cole, succinctly 
puts it, “constitutional law develops not by slippery-slope 
arguments made in the abstract, but through public 
debate about fundamental principles and values, pressed 
by people with powerful commitments willing to make 
sustained efforts in multiple arenas—local, state, and 
federal, public and private, at home and at work.”31 How 
                                               
marry a black woman as for a black woman to marry a white man, and vice 
versa?’”).  
26 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 100 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 
377 (1978). 
27 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  
28 Goodridge v. Dep’t Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).  
29 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 579 (2003) (right of consenting 
adults to sexual intimacy); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) (right to use contraception). 
30 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 768 (2013). 
31 DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO 
MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 91 (2016) (ebook, Kindle ed.). Were it otherwise, 
individual rights, once validated by a constitutional provision, would be 
limitless. Detractors of marriage equality, including Justice Alito, often imply 
that same-sex marriage is the herald of (at least) a constitutional right to 
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can a litigator conceptualize the way in which this 
complicated series of cultural changes occurs, and make it 
work in her own law practice? How can an amorphous set 
of cultural changes be put into motion in a deliberate, 
conscious way by an individual practitioner? These 
questions are explored below.  
 
II.  THE THREE-STAGE LIFE CYCLE OF RIGHTS 
 
If a gross oversimplification is allowed, rights may 
be observed in three stages. The first stage in the life of a 
right occurs when someone speaks it into being. It is the 
point in time where a want is elevated to the status of an 
entitlement, at least in the mind of the wanter.32 And it is 
when an individual or group of individuals, often 
members of an outgroup or subculture with limited 
political power, demand that governing power structures 
behave a certain way in accordance with that entitlement.   
Jumping ahead, the third and final stage is one in 
which a right gains total institutional acceptance. Over 
time, the right is taken for granted by the power 
                                               
polygamy. “‘Suppose we rule in your favor in this case and then, after that, a 
group consisting of two men and two women apply for a marriage license,’ he 
said to Mary Bonauto, one of the lawyers arguing against state bans on same-
sex marriage. ‘Would there be any ground for denying them?’” Amy Davidson 
Sorkin, Justice Alito’s Polygamy Perplex, NEW YORKER (Apr. 30, 2015) 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/justice-alitos-polygamy-
perplex. While the Obergefell oralist, Mary Bonauto, gave an adept legal 
answer, the answer is less a legal one than a practical one; the cultural 
preconditions for such a development in the law have not yet been met. The 
same was true in 1972; although marriage was a fundamental right that 
prohibited states from criminalizing interracial marriage, this same right did 
not extend to same-sex marriage—at least not yet. Of course, this does not 
mean that legitimized polygamy is inevitable, rather that significant cultural 
groundwork would have to be done for the right to plural marriage to be 
institutionally recognized.   
32 It is worth noting that this view is in accord with Rubin’s conception of the 
origin of human rights. According to Rubin, rights have historically derived 
almost exclusively from the concept of natural liberty, or the “assumption 
that people are naturally free, and voluntarily submit to social control in 
return for the benefits of civil order.” Rubin, supra note 5, at 59–60. A better 
way to view the origin of those rights is by starting from the “assumption 
that people are comprehensively controlled by a dense multiplicity of social 
and political prescriptions. Liberty, according to this view, is not something 
they are given, something that they naturally possess, but something they 
must struggle to create.” Id. at 60. Such an approach acknowledges that 
rights, and even the sources of those rights, are ad hoc creations that are 
responsive to attendant circumstances, rather than something fixed, 
universal, or naturally occurring. Moreover, this view “pays homage to the 
dissidents, protestors and nonconformists who have seized liberty from the 
forces of repression.” Id. at 61.  
2019]        Marriage Equality and a Lawyer’s Role in the 
Emergence of “New Rights” 
220 
structures that rejected it in the first place, as if to say “of 
course this is a right, we always recognized it as such.”33 
Those who ignore the institutional acceptance do so at 
their own peril. The right has become part of the pre-
existing power structures and often makes them 
stronger.34 To return to the example of marriage equality, 
its third stage was realized by Obergefell. 
But the second stage—the one at which marriage 
equality found itself in the wake of Windsor—is the one to 
which a lawyer’s craft is most effectively applied. It is 
here when a right, teetering on the precipice of total 
institutional acceptance, may be given a final shove by 
impact litigators. At stage two, a right, having been 
spoken into existence by an individual, begins to gain 
acceptance by people who do not benefit from it,35 and 
later by institutions which formerly suppressed it.  
For example, while Americans tend to take for 
granted the right to be free of race discrimination in the 
workplace, more than half of all states still do not 
explicitly recognize a corresponding right based on sexual 
orientation.36 However, many power structures do 
recognize such a right, including municipalities within 
states that do not.37 This right is ripening. The tension on 
                                               
33 See, e.g., Richard Rothstein, Misteaching History on Racial Segregation, 70 
SCH. ADMIN. 38 (2013), http://www.aasa.org/content.aspx?id=30814).  
34 See Blake Ellis, Gay Marriage Boosts NYC's Economy by $259 Million in 
First Year, CNN MONEY (July 24, 2012, 6:01 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2012/07/24/pf/gay-marriage-economic-
impact/index.htm.  
35 An interesting question is that of when to call what is sought a “right,” and 
to whom. As Cole notes, “Simon and Watts [a pollster and psychologist, 
respectively, interviewed by the author] . . . found that arguments phrased in 
the language of ‘rights’ were not particularly effective.” COLE, supra note 31, 
at 73. However, as noted above, the term “right” itself carries a particular 
contextual meaning and moral weight and must be invoked at some point if 
the right is ever to achieve total institutional recognition. Moreover, Simon 
and Watts appear to contemplate messaging which “characterized marriage 
as a ‘civil right’ and linked the fight for marriage equality to the battles 
against segregation and race-based internment of Japanese-Americans,” 
which, naturally, complicates matters. Id. at 71–72. One need not implicitly 
refer to the bigotry of those who stand against a new right, nor explicitly 
invoke any historical period, for the basic terminology of rights to be effective.  
36 Twenty-six states do not have a state law preventing workplace 
discrimination based upon sexual orientation. Non-Discrimination Laws, 
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-
maps/non_discrimination_laws (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).  
37 See, e.g., LOUISVILLE, KY., CODE ORD. § 92.06 (1999), 
http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Kentucky/loukymetro/titleigeneral
provisions/chapter21ethicscode?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlega
l:louisville_ky$anc=JD_Chapter21; Paducah Becomes Kentucky’s 9th City 
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the proponents’ side is almost equal to that of the 
opponents.38 Likewise, the right not to be executed is 
currently in a state of equilibrium. For nearly all of 
human history, it was a foregone conclusion that the state 
had the power to put people to death. But in the last fifty 
years, nearly all of Western society, and indeed nearly the 
world, has abolished capital punishment.39 In the twenty-
first century alone, eight states have abolished it.40 In 
addition, some courts have acted to eradicate the death 
penalty either in practice or as a matter of constitutional 
principle, and at least two Supreme Court Justices believe 
the practice itself to violate the Eighth Amendment.41 
 Another as-yet unripe idea is that of the would-be 
right to compensated family leave. Again, this is a right 
that much of the world takes for granted already, but it is 
just now gathering steam in the United States.42 It began, 
as rights do, with individuals asserting that to raise a 
family and still be financially solvent is not just a desire, 
but a right. Similarly, medical marijuana, now accepted in 
one form or another by more than half the states, is 
nearing its critical mass.43 The list of rights in limbo 
between partial and total institutional acceptance, 
examples of which are explored in more depth in Section 
VIII, infra, is getting longer all the time.  
                                               
with LGBT Fairness, ACLU KY. (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.aclu-
ky.org/en/news/paducah-becomes-kentuckys-9th-city-lgbt-fairness-0.  
38 Non-discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, 
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2018); see also Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 
(7th Cir. 2017). 
39 Oliver Smith, Countries That Still Have the Death Penalty, TELEGRAPH 
(July 6, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/maps-and-
graphics/countries-that-still-have-the-death-penalty/.    
40 The eight states that have abolished the death penalty in the twenty-first 
century are Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, and Washington. 30 States with the Death Penalty and 20 
States with Death Penalty Bans, PROCON.ORG (Oct. 16, 2018, 10:30 AM), 
https://deathpenalty.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=001172.  
41 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(describing his belief that the death penalty now may qualify as cruel and 
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment). 
42 Kelly Wallace, Paid Leave For Parents: What's The Right Amount Of 
Time?, CNN (June 29, 2017, 2:05 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/health/paid-leave-how-much-time-
enough/index.html. 
43 “A total of 33 states, the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico have 
approved a comprehensive public medical marijuana and cannabis 
programs.” State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Jan. 23, 
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-
laws.aspx.  
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To sum up: for our purposes, rights occur in three 
stages:  
 
1. A right is conceived by an individual or group and 
is spoken into being. It has no formal, institutional 
recognition. 
2. A right gains some formal recognition, usually 
through a court opinion, an executive order,44 or a 
legislative act. 
3. A right achieves total institutional recognition and 
becomes part of the status quo. Non-recognition of 
the right by individuals leads to negative 
consequences.45  
 
IV.  MOVERS OF RIGHTS 
 
Much has been written about the origin and 
development of rights through the courts.46 But little is 
understood of the mechanisms that further such 
development. A notable recent exception is the work of 
David Cole.47 This Article, in part, uses Cole’s expository 
framework together along with the author’s own 
experiences and other theoretical frameworks to create a 
conceptual model to be used by practicing attorneys who 
seek vindication of “new” rights on behalf of clients.  
Put another way, above, this Article seeks to 
provide a preliminary answer to this question: what are 
the factors that help a right get from stage one to stage 
three in the aforementioned model, and what is a lawyer’s 
                                               
44 Executive actions are not dealt with extensively in this Article, but a 
noteworthy example in the context of marriage equality is then-Mayor of San 
Francisco Gavin Newsom’s decision to issue marriage licenses on February 
12, 2004 (ten years to the day from the historic trial court opinion on 
marriage equality in Kentucky). Melanie Mason, When Gavin Newsom Issued 
Marriage Licenses In San Francisco, His Party Was Furious. Now, It’s A 
Campaign Ad, L.A. TIMES (May 15, 2018, 12:05 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-gavin-newsom-gay-marriage-
20180515-story.html.  
45 See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. 2015). This model is akin 
to the Hegelian dialectic: thesis (an assertion of a right) meets antithesis (the 
opposition to institutional recognition) resulting in synthesis (formal 
recognition of the right, albeit probably in a watered-down version, if you ask 
those who originally asserted it). See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Hegel’s Dialectics, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel-dialectics/.  
46 Important Supreme Court Cases for Civil Rights, LEADERSHIP CONF., 
https://civilrights.org/judiciary/federal-court-system/important-supreme-
court-cases-civil-rights (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).  
47 COLE, supra note 31. 
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role in making it happen? As alluded to above, the answer 
lies in stage two, in which a focused effort may be made to 
shove a right from partial to total institutional 
recognition. 
If that sounds relatively simple in theory, it is not 
at all simple in practice. Rights have historically 
languished for (at least) decades at stage two. For 
example, when delegates got together at Seneca Falls, 
New York, in 1848 to discuss the future of women’s rights, 
the concept of suffrage was a fringe idea favored by only a 
few at the convention.48 It was briefly considered and, 
ironically enough, voted down.49 The next eighty years 
were an uphill, door-to-door battle that included a 
Supreme Court loss, but which finally resulted in the 
Nineteenth Amendment.50 Or consider that even after 
Franklin Roosevelt, a popular President with a disability, 
took office for three terms in a row, it was another fifty 
years before the Americans with Disabilities Act was 
signed into law.51 The battle for institutional recognition 
is often tedious, taxing, and bloody. But the last thirty 
years have seen a dramatic increase in the pace of 
cultural interchange, such that people can watch rights 
come to fruition in real time and can consciously aid in 
the process.52 
In the abstract, what common factors moved 
suffrage from a fanciful notion to a full-fledged right, led 
to taking the right to be free of racial discrimination in 
the workplace for granted and caused the Court’s 
dramatic shift between Baker and Obergefell? As a 
                                               
48 Allison Lange, Suffrage and the Seneca Falls Convention, NWHM, (Fall 
2015), http://www.crusadeforthevote.org/seneca-falls-meeting/.  
49 Woman Suffrage: History and Time Line, VCU LIBR. SOC. WELFARE HIST. 
PROJECT, https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/woman-suffrage/woman-
suffrage-history/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).  
50 See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875). This illustrates a fact 
that should be fairly self-evident in this context, which is that institutional 
recognition can be achieved through legislation, or perhaps even executive 
action, as well as via the judicial branch. How the process plays out outside of 
a judicial realm is beyond the scope of this Article.   
51 42 U.S.C. § 12101–12213 (1990). 
52 The author is cognizant that “an ‘individual’s rights’ model . . . exists 
specifically to legitimize power over ongoing relationships of exploitation.” 
Gabriel Arkles, Pooja Gehi & Elana Redfield, The Role of Lawyers in Trans 
Liberation: Building a Transformative Movement for Social Change, 8 
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 579, 595 (2010), Strategies for change outside of the 
legal system are beyond the scope of this Article; rather the focus here is on 
bringing diverse elements to work within the confines of existing legal power 
structures.  
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guidepost, this article suggests an examination of five 
primary forces, or “movers,” which push rights from stage 
two to stage three, as represented by the figure below. 
 
1. The Activists 
 
These are the individuals who assert that their 
wants, needs, or desires ought to become rights. They are 
the prime movers for social change. Their ideas tend to be 
developed further, and taken more seriously, once the 
remaining four categories get involved. But the most 
important step happens here, as the mere assertion that 
something is a right carries weight in and of itself, even to 
those who believe it is not (or should not be) a right.  
 
2. The Media 
 
News media can often uncover information that a 
lawyer might otherwise overlook or not have access to. 
But the truly critical role played by the media is that of 
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provoking people to think—and talk—about something 
they otherwise wouldn’t. Similarly, someone asserting a 
right can be humanized, and ultimately normalized, by 
the media. When a person’s face is repeatedly beamed 
into someone’s living room, it makes ostracizing or 
“othering” that person, and their associated experiences, 
more difficult.53  
 
3. The Academics 
 
These are the scholars, typically associated with 
universities, who validate, develop, and lend credence to 
the ideas of the activists. In the context of litigation, 
academics tend to further rights in two ways: 1) by 
publishing works that provide foundation for, or aid in the 
development of, the way a right is presented to a court by 
attorneys; and 2) by providing direct or indirect testimony 
in judicial proceedings. Through their work, academics 
assure judges (and the public) that a court’s decision will 
not inadvertently bring about social disaster by being 
drastically out of sync with scientific or community 
standards.  
 
4. The Organizations 
 
These are officially organized groups of activists 
and lawyers who are dedicated to one or more discrete 
purposes, generally advocacy and/or policy matters. An 
organization’s focus on both particular policies and the 
applicable law often provide a focused view of the overall 
health of a fledgling right, and how to help grow its wings.  
 
5. The Trench Lawyers 
 
These are lawyers in private practice, engaged in 
the work of representing individuals in civil rights cases. 
In some ways, the individual lawyer’s mission is 
diametrically opposed to the mission of a national 
organization. National organizations have a macrocosmic 
focus—how can we solve the big-picture problem? But the 
                                               
53 “In this way, we can conceive of a powerful challenger movement as 
‘holding up a mirror’ in which society recognizes its own reflection.” 
JONATHAN SMUCKER, HEGEMONY HOW-TO: A ROADMAP FOR RADICALS 62 (2017). 
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individual advocate’s focus is necessarily microcosmic—
how can I solve this client’s problem?  
The process of successfully bringing rights into 
being is a holistic one. The star model is apt because all 
five of these categories touch upon, feed off of, and play 
into one another. A successful litigator knows how to use 
all five simultaneously; she will use the narratives of the 
activists, the resources of the national organizations, the 
platform of the media, and the ideas of the academics to 
push a right out of the shadows into the light of 
institutional recognition.54 
Unfortunately, the law tends to be an exclusionary 
profession, even in the context of civil and human rights 
work. Legal and social movement scholars have noted:  
 
troubling dynamics where lawyers take center 
stage, where the voices of people with the most 
privilege in our communities are centralized, 
where knowledge stays within the legal 
profession rather than being shared outside of 
it, where an intersectional analysis is lacking, 
and where decisions about priorities are made in 
isolation from many key movement leaders and 
the people who are most impacted by the 
issues.55 
 
This model seeks to avoid such outcomes by actively 
encouraging the practitioner to incorporate the ideas and 
resources of the other “movers” into flexible, collaborative 
litigation strategies. 
  
V.  HOW THE MOVERS AFFECTED MARRIAGE 
 
Utilizing this view of rights formation, there is an 
observable reason why Richard Baker lost at the Supreme 
Court in 1973. At that time, sex acts between consenting 
adults of the same sex were still criminalized in much of 
                                               
54 See generally “Successful social movements characteristically put great 
effort into actively courting influential supporters, in order to set more social 
forces into aligned motion.” Id. at 70. Note that this is in keeping with Social 
Movement Theory, which “has shown that it takes more than discontent with 
one’s current situation to produce a social movement. Instead, a movement is 
created when groups combine their ideologies with instrumentally rational 
action.” JoAnne Sweeny, The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act: Using its 
Past to Predict its Future, 12 LOY. J.  PUB. INT. L. 39, 47 (2010). 
55 Arkles, supra note 52, at 584. 
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the United States.56 There was no national dialogue about 
same-sex marriage at the beginning of the 1970s because 
there was no meaningful national dialogue about same-
sex relations of any kind.57 And the media was no help. In 
1967, Mike Wallace reported that “homosexuality [was] 
an enigma” and that “Americans consider homosexuality 
more harmful to society than adultery, abortion, and 
prostitution.”58 The rare gay television or movie character 
was a foil, or an outright villain.59 In Hollywood, for an 
actor or director to be publicly identified as gay or lesbian 
was often a career-ender as late as the early 1990s.60  
Academics, by and large, condemned same-sex 
attractions too (or were mostly silent on the matter).61 At 
academic institutions, openness about same-sex attraction 
“commonly was cause for dismissal or denial of tenure.”62 
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) did not 
remove homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders until 1973—the year Baker 
was decided.63  
Also that year, advocacy organizations supportive 
of same-sex couples were virtually nonexistent. The 
ACLU had just begun its Sexual Privacy Project, which 
                                               
56 Richard Weinmeyer, The Decriminalization of Sodomy in the United States, 
16 AMA J. OF ETHICS 916 (Nov. 2014), https://journalofethics.ama-
assn.org/article/decriminalization-sodomy-united-states/2014-11; Ed 
Grabianowski, How the Stonewall Riots Worked, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, 
https://history.howstuffworks.com/historical-events/stonewall-riots.htm (last 
visited February 1, 2019).  
57 Rebecca J. Rosen, A Glimpse Into 1970s Gay Activism, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 
26, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/a-glimpse-
into-1970s-gay-activism/284077/.  
58 Kim Smythe, The Homosexuals—Mike Wallaces CONTROVERSIAL 1967 
CBS Report (FULL VIDEO), YOUTUBE (Sept. 13, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tu1r6igCODw (‘The Homosexuals’ is a 
1967 episode of the documentary television series CBS Reports. The hour-
long broadcast featured a discussion of a number of topics related to 
homosexuality and homosexuals. Mike Wallace anchored the episode, which 
aired on Mar. 7, 1967.). 
59 Fred Fejes & Kevin Petrich, Invisibility, Homophobia and Heterosexism: 
Lesbians, Gays and the Media, 10 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COMM. 395, 400 
(1993).  
60 Id. at 399. 
61 VERNON A. ROSARIO, SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES (1997). 
62 Fejes, supra note 59, at 396. 
63 Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, BEHAV. SCI. 
565, 565 (Dec. 4, 2015), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4695779/. For an engaging 
history of how the APA did its historic about face on this issue, see 81 Words, 
THIS AMERICAN LIFE (originally broadcast January 18, 2002) (available at 
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/204/81-words).  
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was then years ahead of its time. There was no GLAD,64 
NCLR,65 or Lambda Legal.66 And even the ACLU had 
comparatively little academic research, and almost no 
legal precedent, upon which to base its advocacy. 67 
In short, every one of the five “movers” (save the 
activists alone) was either not helpful enough, or was 
directly harmful, to the idea of same-sex marriage forty-
seven years ago. Under the model above, the right was 
barely at stage one. There was no institutional recognition 
in mainstream society anywhere in the world. The 
litigators of Baker v. Nelson, brave as they were, were 
cramming a very large square peg into an infinitesimally 
small round hole. The nation was, in a very real sense, 
not ready yet. 
Obergefell presented a completely different story, 
discussed below.  
 
A.  Media 
 
By 2015, because of the media’s attention to the 
narratives told by activists and guided by advocacy/policy 
organizations, America knew gays and lesbians. While 
LGBT communities stayed mostly underground and out of 
the news in the 1960s, beginning with the Stonewall 
uprising in 196968 and into the 1970s, they garnered more 
                                               
64 History, GAY AND LESBIAN ADVOCS. AND DEFENDERS, 
https://www.glad.org/about/history/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
65 About Us, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS., http://www.nclrights.org/about-us/ 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
66 Official condemnation by bar associations or other legal organizations 
directed at attorneys seeking to represent lesbians and gay men is, 
thankfully, scarce. However, on the topic of Lambda Legal, it is worth noting 
that obtaining representation for LGBT issues prior to the 1990s was not 
easy. Lambda Legal History, LAMBDA LEGAL, 
https://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us/history (last visited Sept. 3, 2018) 
(“Because of the overwhelming climate of prejudice against gay people, we 
became our own first client: A panel of New York judges turned down our 
application to be a nonprofit organization because, in their view, our mission 
was ‘neither benevolent nor charitable.’” This is a testimony to the prejudice 
against gays and lesbians present in the private bar at the time). 
 But see Burton v. Cascade School District, 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Or. 1972), 
aff'd 512 F.2d 850 (1975).  
67 For an extensive account of “every civil case dealing with homosexuality” 
up until 1999, along with a brief history of scientific research into sexuality, 
see Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of 
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1015 (1999).  
68 See Douglas Nejaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of 
Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 
87, 95 (2014) (“After Stonewall, the radical politics of gay liberation became a 
widespread animating principle of LGBT mobilization.”). 
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serious coverage (though often derisive in tone, as in the 
Wallace piece noted above).69 Four years after the Baker 
decision, there were 262 gay or lesbian periodicals 
nationwide.70 In addition, tragedy made gay people more 
visible and humanized them to the rest of the world. 
Brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, and friends died of 
AIDS in the 1980s, forcing “the media to regard the gay 
and lesbian community more seriously and in a different 
light.”71 In the 1990s, there was Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,72 
Will and Grace,73 and Ellen DeGeneres.74 Marriage 
equality and anti-discrimination legislation became 
serious national topics in the 2000s.  
In 2013, Maurice Blanchard and Dominique James 
were activists asserting a right that, although perhaps no 
longer novel as an idea, was still counter-majoritarian in 
Kentucky. They went to the county clerk’s office and 
                                               
69 Fejes, supra note 59, at 403. 
70 Id. at 403. 
71 Id. at 404. One noted commentator has discussed the “Will & Grace” theory 
of cultural change: “A mainstream television comedy featuring openly gay 
characters demonstrated what social scientists have long known: the single 
most important indicator of one’s support for gay rights is whether one knows 
someone who is gay. In a pinch, it seems, a fellow on TV will do.” Dahlia 
Lithwick, Extreme Makeover: The Story Behind the Story of Lawrence v. 
Texas, NEW YORKER (Mar. 12, 2012), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/12/extreme-makeover-dahlia-
lithwick.  
72 “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” became official United States policy in American 
military forces in December 1993 and was a national topic of conversation. 10 
U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111–321, 123 Stat. 3515. (2010)); see Bradford J. Kelley, The 
Rainbow Sea Change: The Impact of Popular Culture on Homosexual Rights, 
16 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 283, 331 (2014). 
73 See generally Stacey L. Sobel, Culture Shifting at Warp Speed: How the 
Law, Public Engagement, and Will & Grace Led to Social Change for LGBT 
People, 89 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 143, 179 (2015) (citing Felicia Sonmez, Biden: 
I’m ‘Absolutely Comfortable’ with Gay Couples Having Same Rights as 
Straight Couples, WASH. POST (May 6, 2012, 10:14 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/post/biden-im-absolutely-
comfortable-with-gay-couples-having-same-rights-as-straight-
couples/2012/05/06/gIQA59Wg5T_blog.html (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“I think “Will and Grace” probably did more to educate the 
American public [about LGBT people] than almost anything anybody’s ever 
done so far . . . . And I think people fear that which is different. Now they’re 
beginning to understand.”)). 
74 “Public figures like Caitlyn Jenner, Laverne Cox, and Chaz Bono—I think 
it helps, absolutely. Like Ellen DeGeneres for the gay community, who has 
changed the world—you have to be glued to your prejudice to dislike Ellen 
DeGeneres.” Deborah Kelly &, Jennifer C. Pizer, Department: On Direct: 
Senior Counsel and Law and Policy Project National Director, Lambda Legal, 
38 L.A. LAW. 8 (Dec. 2015); see also Sobel, supra note 73, at 180. 
2019]        Marriage Equality and a Lawyer’s Role in the 
Emergence of “New Rights” 
230 
demanded a marriage license.75 When the clerk informed 
them that she could not legally issue a license to two men, 
they refused to leave. They were arrested, prosecuted, and 
fined one penny by a Louisville jury.76  
Naturally, their act of defiance created media 
uproar.77 And people talked. Why shouldn’t they have the 
same rights as different-sex couples? What’s the 
difference between this couple and any other couple? Who 
gets hurt if they get married? And so on. People who had 
never before thought of two men getting married asked 
these questions at the dinner table. These questions, 
fueled by stories like Maurice and Dominique’s, laid the 
groundwork for marriage equality’s final shove from 
partial to total institutional recognition.  
Their prosecution was six months before United 
States v. Windsor. Around a month after the Windsor 
opinion, and seven months after Maurice and Dominique’s 
prosecution, trench lawyers filed a lawsuit on behalf of 
couples who had been married in states that recognized 
same-sex marriage, seeking recognition of those 
marriages by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Judge 
John Heyburn, a Republican appointee, issued a 
thoughtful twenty-three-page opinion vindicating the 
plaintiffs’ rights—rights that were scarcely worthy of 
judicial discussion just a few decades prior.78 The opinion 
begins by saying that “Kentucky’s denial of recognition for 
valid same-sex marriages violates the United States 
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection under the 
law, even under the most deferential standard of 
review.”79 The day before Valentine’s Day 2014, Time 
                                               
75 See Andrew Wolfson, KY Gay Couple Fined 1 Cent In Fight For Marriage, 
COURIER-JOURNAL & USA TODAY (Nov. 27, 2013, 9:23 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/27/kentucky-gay-
couple-marriage-protest/3765599/.  
76 Id. 
77 See, e.g., id.; Gay Couple Who Protested For License Fined 1 Cent, 
WHAS11.COM (Nov. 27, 2013, 5:14 PM), 
https://www.whas11.com/article/news/local/gay-couple-who-protested-for-
license-fined-1-cent/417-266056181; Associated Press, Gay Couple Who 
Protested for Ky. Marriage License Fined 1 Cent, LGBTQ NATION (Nov. 26, 
2013), https://www.lgbtqnation.com/2013/11/gay-couple-who-protested-for-ky-
marriage-license-fined-1-cent/.  
78 Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014), rev’d sub nom. 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
79 Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 544.  
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magazine pronounced: “Kentucky Judge Turns Gay 
Marriage Tide in the South.”80 
Backlash to coverage of the Kentucky opinion was 
so tepid as to be non-existent, especially compared to the 
extreme reaction by many state legislatures following a 
similar victory in Massachusetts just ten years earlier.81 
This is mostly because by 2014, the broader public was 
accustomed to the story. The idea of marriage equality 
was no longer a far-fetched, fanciful, fringe idea but a 
regular feature of daily American discourse. 82   
After the victory in the recognition case, Maurice 
and Dominique filed an intervening complaint asserting a 
federal constitutional right to marriage equality.83 By the 
time the Supreme Court agreed to hear Obergefell in 
January 2015, more than sixty courts, including the 
Kentucky district court, had declared marriage bans 
unconstitutional, prompting near-ubiquitous media 
coverage.84 By then, everyone in the country was asking 
the questions Kentucky asked when Maurice and 
Dominique were arrested. Even straight middle-
Americans wanted to know: what’s the big deal?85 
 
                                               
80 Michael A. Lindenberger, Kentucky Judge Turns Gay Marriage Tide in the 
South, TIME (Feb. 13, 2014), http://nation.time.com/2014/02/13/kentucky-
judge-turns-gay-marriage-tide-in-the-south/. Note that the author takes no 
position as to whether Kentucky is in fact “the south.” 
81 Goodridge v. Dep’t Public Health, 798 N.E.2d at 969; COLE, supra note 31, 
at 49. 
82 For example, a Pew Research Center study of 500 news articles about 
same-sex marriage in the months leading up to Windsor revealed that nearly 
half of them reflected support for marriage equality in some way, while only 
9% focused on opposition (the rest were considered neutral). Paul Hitlin, Amy 
Mitchell & Mark Jurkowitz, News Coverage Conveys Strong Momentum for 
Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (June 17, 2013), 
http://www.journalism.org/2013/06/17/news-coverage-conveys-strong-
momentum/. Perhaps more important here is that there were nearly 500 
stories from major media outlets discussing same-sex marriage in a period of 
less than three months. It would have been difficult for anyone in America to 
escape this coverage.    
83 See Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014), rev'd sub nom. 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev'd sub nom. Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
84 COLE, supra note 31, at 87; see also note 82. 
85 Indeed, support for marriage equality spiked in the years before Windsor 
even among conservatives who were formerly staunchly opposed. See 
Jonathan Merritt, If the Supreme Court Legalizes Gay Marriage in 2015, How 
Will Evangelicals Respond?, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Jan. 5, 2015), 
https://religionnews.com/2015/01/05/supreme-court-legalizes-gay-marriage-
2015-will-evangelicals-respond/ (“From 2003 to 2013, support for gay 
marriage among white evangelicals more than doubled, and support among 
Catholics rose by 22 percentage points.”). 
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B.  Organizations 
 
1972, the year of the Baker decision, turned out to 
be a watershed year for LGBT advocacy groups. Parents 
and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) was formed 
that same year.86 A year later, the National Gay Task 
Force (now the National LGBTQ Task Force) was formed 
and immediately set to work on establishing a nationwide 
network of media organizations for the purpose of 
“minimizing negative portrayals of homosexuals and 
homosexuality.”87 As a result, “the National Association of 
Broadcasters Code Authority agreed to interpret the NAB 
Code to guarantee that gays and lesbians would be fairly 
treated.”88 This began the critical process, noted above, of 
slowly introducing LGBT people to the broader American 
public, as gay and lesbian characters began to appear (as 
something other than foil or antagonist) on sitcoms and 
prime-time dramas.89  
More advocacy organizations were formed over the 
next few decades; many with a focus on lesbians and gay 
men and, over time, a few with a particular focus on 
marriage equality. For example, the Human Rights 
Campaign Fund PAC, now commonly known as HRC, was 
formed in 198090; by the early 2000s, its membership had 
bloomed to around 500,000 members.91 In 2012, HRC’s 
Executive Director resigned to co-chair President Obama’s 
campaign for re-election92 —a testament to the influence 
of LGBT advocacy groups on governing institutions by the 
time Windsor was decided. Also in 1973, Lambda Legal 
was founded as the nation’s first legal organization 
dedicated to LGBT equality.93 Another major legal 
                                               
86 Bonnie J. Morris, History of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 
Social Movements, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, 
http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/history.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
87 Fejes, supra note 59, at 401. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Our History, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/hrc-story/about-us 
(last visited July 30, 2018). 
91 Emily Althafer, Leading Gay Rights Advocate to Speak at U.F., U. FLA. 
NEWS (Jan. 23, 2006), http://news.ufl.edu/archive/2006/01/leading-gay-rights-
advocate-to-speak-at-uf.html.   
92  Byron Tau, Obama Campaign Announces Co-Chairs, POLITICO (Feb. 22, 
2012, 6:32 AM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/politico44/2012/02/obama-
campaign-announces-co-chairs-115161.  
93 Lambda Legal History, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/about-
us/history (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).  
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organization, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, was 
formed four years later.94 In 2003, a Lambda Lawyer, 
Evan Wolfson, who litigated the Hawaii case in the 1990s, 
formed an advocacy group solely focused on achieving 
marriage equality.95 And of course, the ACLU’s efforts on 
behalf of LGBT people burgeoned from the 1970s through 
the 2010s, in both the courtroom and on the ground. 
These groups, with the help of private lawyers, lost a few 
marriage cases96 but, as discussed above, began making 
intermittent progress in the 1990s.  
As discussed by Cole, another important aspect of 
the fight for marriage equality is that shortly after the 
sparse few judicial victories in various states, ballot 
initiatives on marriage equality—spearheaded by 
advocacy organizations—started to succeed all over the 
country.97 To be sure, the successes were preceded by 
legislative and popular backlash. Twenty-seven states 
amended their constitutions in response to the judicial 
victory the Goodridge case realized in Massachusetts.98 
One of these states was Kentucky, which saw a 
referendum defining marriage between “one man and one 
woman” handily approved by 75% of voters in 2004.99  
At the time, these amendments seemed to be a 
setback for the movement. An especially painful blow was 
dealt in California with the passing of Proposition 8, 
which prohibited recognition of same-sex marriage in the 
state.100 If marriage equality could not be recognized by 
one of the most liberal states in the country through a 
                                               
94 Mission & History, NCLR, http://www.nclrights.org/about-us/mission-
history/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
95 Winning the Freedom to Marry Nationwide: The Inside Story of a 
Transformative Campaign Freedom to Marry, FREEDOM TO MARRY, 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/how-it-happened (last visited Feb. 1, 
2019).  
96 See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 
Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036 
(9th Cir. 1982); Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 206 
Ariz. 276, 278 (Ct. App. 2003); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); 
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
97 COLE, supra note 31, at 64–65. 
98Id. at 49. 
99 Kentucky, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., UNIV. S. CAL. GOULD SCH. OF L., 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states/state.cfm?id=36 (last visited Sept. 3, 
2018). 
100 California Proposition 8, the “Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to 
Marry” Initiative (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_8,_the_%22Eliminates_Right_o
f_Same-Sex_Couples_to_Marry%22_Initiative_(2008) (last visited Sept. 3, 
2018). 
2019]        Marriage Equality and a Lawyer’s Role in the 
Emergence of “New Rights” 
234 
popular vote, how was there to be any hope of winning it 
nationwide? But all the attention garnered by these ballot 
initiatives carried two very important consequences. 
First, the losses strengthened both the resolve and the 
resources of organizations and individual leaders working 
to rally people around the issue of LGBT rights generally. 
Second, the extensive mainstream coverage of story after 
story on gay and lesbian families between the late 1990s 
through the early 2010s, which, as noted above, had 
become considerably more sympathetic to the LGBT 
movement, humanized those families to a broad base of 
media consumers.  
All four states involved in Obergefell had at least 
one lawyer from the ACLU, Lambda Legal, NCLR, or 
GLAD representing plaintiff couples. These lawyers 
brought with them the decades of diverse, strategic, and 
focused experience garnered by their respective 
organizations. 
 
C. Academics 
 
The academics played no small part in the cultural 
shift in favor of marriage equality. Immediately after 
Baker, the topic of same-sex marriage became an item of 
interest to legal scholars, who now had a jurisprudential 
“hook.” In 1973, the Yale Law Journal published a note 
making an extensive argument in favor of marriage 
equality.101 By 1996, noted Ivy League academics had 
published entire books devoted to the theory and practice 
of marriage equality.102 In addition, the APA had by then 
“rejected the stigma of mental illness that the medical 
and mental health professions had previously placed on 
sexual minorities.”103  
As part of Michigan’s marriage litigation, the 
plaintiffs submitted the testimony of six expert witnesses, 
including professors at Yale, Stanford, and Harvard.104 In 
                                               
101 Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973). 
102 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: 
FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996); See EVAN WOLFSON, 
WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS (2004). 
103 REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 11 (Aug. 2009), 
https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf.  
104 See generally Case Profile: DeBoer v. Snyder, CIV. RTS. LITIG. 
CLEARINGHOUSE, U. MICH. L. SCH., 
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contrast, the closest thing Michigan could get to a star 
witness—Mark Regnerus—had been so totally discredited 
by mainstream sociologists that it actually tipped the 
scales in the plaintiffs’ favor.105 As one amicus put it, the 
“scientific and medical consensus” debunking same-sex 
attraction as a social or mental illness had “become widely 
accepted over the past decades, to the point where there is 
so ‘great an analytical gap between the data and the 
opinion proffered’” that its scholarly opponents often 
“would not qualify to testify as expert witnesses.”106 
Because the academic consensus was so broad, it became 
difficult for even the most curmudgeonly of jurists to 
ignore it. 
Academics contributed directly to the Obergefell 
case before the Supreme Court.107 The Petitioners’ briefs 
in Obergefell, as well as those of the amici, demonstrated 
a synthesis of a diverse range of disciplines, from 
sociology to biology, history to religion; they are the 
quintessence of the Brandeis brief108 (that is, a brief that 
asks “courts to take judicial notice of social facts, 
primarily to provide justification for challenges to 
                                               
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12811 (last visited Sept. 3, 
2018). 
105 Statement from the Chair Regarding Professor Regnerus, U. TEX. AUSTIN C. 
LIBERAL ARTS (Apr. 12, 2014), 
https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/sociology/news/article.php/sociology/news/7572?i
d=7572 (in which Regnerus’ own institution notes that his research does not 
“reflect the views of the American Sociological Association, which takes the 
position that the conclusions he draws from his study of gay parenting are 
fundamentally flawed on conceptual and methodological grounds and that 
findings from Dr. Regnerus’ work have been cited inappropriately in efforts to 
diminish the civil rights and legitimacy of LBGTQ partners and their 
families”); Roberta A. Kaplan, “It’s All About Edie, Stupid”: Lessons from 
Litigating United States v. Windsor, 29 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 85, 95 (2015) 
(Regnerus had been thoroughly discredited by the time Windsor was argued. 
“[T]he American Sociological Association, in its amicus brief submitted to the 
Supreme Court, condemned his work in no uncertain terms, stating that it 
‘provides no support for the conclusions that same-sex-parents are inferior 
parents.’”). 
106 Brief for Survivors of Sexual Orientation Change Therapies as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) 
(No. 14-556), at 5 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)), 
http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/2015.03.04.-Survivors-
of-Sexual-Orientation-Change-Therapies-Amicus.pdf.  
107 Kentucky’s proposed oralist on the question of licensure was professor 
Jeffrey L. Fisher of the Stanford University Law School. See Love v. 
Kentucky, INFORMAVORE.MEDIA, http://informavore.media/projects/love-v-
kentucky/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
108 Party Briefs on the Merits, U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/ObergefellHodges/PartyBriefs/ (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2018).   
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legislation”).109 These briefs could not have been written 
in the 1970s or 80s.  
 
D.  Activists 
 
Emboldened by a strengthening media presence 
and the increasing clout of advocacy organizations, 
outspoken individual activists grew in number and 
influence from the 1970s on. In 1979, the first march on 
Washington, D.C. for gay rights occurred, organized by a 
loose confederation of prominent activists (including 
Harvey Milk before his assassination).110 Another march 
in 1993, organized by the then twenty-year-old National 
Gay (and Lesbian) Task Force,111 boasted as many as one 
million supporters.112 These grassroots activists had years 
before planted the seeds of success for Obergefell, albeit 
primarily in discrete corners of the Northeast and 
California. In Vermont, for example, a concerted effort 
was made to teach gay and lesbian activists “to tell their 
own stories effectively,” and to put those stories (and 
stories of the activists themselves) in the homes of people 
who were undecided on marriage equality.113 These efforts 
curtailed the ability of lawmakers to do what lawmakers 
did in so many states in the early 2000s, i.e., introduce 
state constitutional amendments restricting marriage to 
being between a man and a woman.114 Gay and lesbian 
couples, now humanized, could no longer be seen as the 
sharp-fanged closet monsters voters’ parents had warned 
them about. 
The efforts of these activists, and their narratives, 
made a big difference in legal landscapes. But Kentucky 
                                               
109 Judith A. McMorrow, Moving from a Brandeis Brief to a Brandeis Law 
Firm: Challenges and Opportunities for Holistic Legal Services in the United 
States, 33 TOURO L. REV. 259, 262 (2017). 
110 Morris, supra note 86. 
111 The name had by then been changed from the National Gay Task Force. 
About Mission and History, NAT’L LGBTQ TASK FORCE, 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/about/mission-history.html (last visited January 
23, 2019). For a thorough history of these marches, see AMIN GHAZIANI, THE 
DIVIDENDS OF DISSENT: HOW CONFLICT AND CULTURE WORK IN LESBIAN AND 
GAY MARCHES ON WASHINGTON (2008).  
112 Id.; Morris, supra note 86. 
113 COLE, supra note 31, at 37. 
114 See, e.g., Megan Moore, The Money Behind the 2006 Marriage 
Amendments, THE INST. ON MONEY IN ST. POL. (July 23, 2007), 
https://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/the-money-
behind-the-2006-marriage-amendments.  
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(and most of the Midwest/South) did not benefit from the 
efforts of activists or organizations in the way that the 
coasts did, as evidenced by the overwhelming number of 
votes on the 2004 Federal Marriage Amendment.115 As 
such, in 2013, Kentucky trench lawyers had a 
constitutional amendment to deal with, and no 
organizational support because Kentucky did not figure 
into the plan of the national organizations that had been 
working on marriage for years. And while the 
organizations were right—plaintiffs lost at the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, after all116—no one could have 
foreseen the dramatic shift in popular and judicial 
thinking that occurred nationwide in the two years 
following Windsor. Were it not for emboldened activists—
quite separate and independent from advocacy 
organizations—at the state level, Kentucky’s legal team 
might have had no clients at all, and the “tide turning” 
described by Time might never have occurred. 
 
E.  The Movers Working in Concert 
 
One example of an observable, real-time impact on 
a major institution (the Executive Branch) made by a 
concerted effort of at least three of our five movers (an 
individual activist, the media, and an advocacy 
organization) is recounted by Cole, who describes how the 
media was activated on a specific instance of LGBT 
discrimination in a meaningful way some four years 
before Windsor.117 In 2009, the Obama Administration 
filed a brief in a DOMA case in California which likened 
same-sex marriage regulation to legal restrictions on 
marriages for minors and between first cousins, 
prompting one activist blogger to write “Holy cow, Obama 
invoked incest and people marrying children.”118 
 
The charge got picked up by ABC News, and the 
following day, Joe Solmonese, president of 
Human Rights Campaign, wrote President 
Obama, saying, “I cannot overstate the pain 
that we feel as human beings and as families 
                                               
115 See Kentucky, supra note 99.  
116 See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). 
117 See COLE, supra note 31, at 41, 84–86.  
118 Id. at 85. 
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when we read an argument, presented in 
federal court, implying that our own marriages 
have no more constitutional standing than 
incestuous ones.” The New York Times followed 
up four days later with an editorial condemning 
the administration for its defense of DOMA. . . 
.radar. After much internal wrangling, the 
administration did what Bonauto, Wolfson, and 
many others had asked: it took the position that 
heightened scrutiny should apply to DOMA, 
and that it could not defend the law under such 
scrutiny.119 
 
There are no doubt countless other examples of this model 
at work on both microcosmic and macrocosmic levels; in 
other words, it can work for individual practitioners in 
both the short and the long run.  
In 2015, two-and-a-half years after being arrested, 
Maurice and Dominique were lawfully wedded in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky.120 Just four decades after 
Baker v. Nelson, the same Court decided that not only 
was marriage equality something worthy of the Court’s 
time, but that a bona fide constitutional right existed 
where none had before.121 While litigation ultimately 
drove the final nail into the coffin of marriage 
discrimination, it was a dramatic shift in attitudes that 
was truly responsible for its demise.122 And that shift in 
attitudes was not brought about solely by brass-tacks 
litigation, not by a longshot.123 Rather it was this 
                                               
119 Id.at 85–86. 
120 See Roberto Roldan, Once Jailed, Gay Couple Gets Marriage License, 
COURIER J. (last updated June 30, 2015, 3:29 PM), https://www.courier-
journal.com/story/news/local/2015/06/29/jailed-gay-couple-gets-marriage-
license/29488461/.  
121 See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
122 See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2017), 
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/.  
123 “[D]o not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.” 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Interestingly, and in 
contrast, the original Bourke opinion in Kentuky acknowledges the dramatic 
changes from Baker to Windsor, but remains focused almost solely on 
jurisprudential development within the courts, as opposed to outside forces 
which undeniably shaped that development. District Judge John Heyburn 
wrote: 
[J]udicial thinking on this issue has evolved ever so slowly. 
That is because courts usually answer only the questions that 
come before it. Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes aptly described 
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combination of activists, media, academics, and advocacy 
organizations that allowed the coup de grace to be 
effectively delivered in court. Obergefell therefore 
presents a model of how all five movers can manage to 
effect institutional changes. 
 
 
VI.  PUTTING THIS MODEL TO WORK: A LAWYER’S 
ROLE 
 
This model for advancing emerging rights is a 
crude one. It should be dissected, explored, and refined.124 
And there are, no doubt, readers who will say, “yes of 
course, this is how movements work.” But the question is: 
how many practicing lawyers consciously use these 
elements to achieve a goal? The likely answer, especially 
for private lawyers who represent individuals every day, 
is very few. Private lawyers tend to develop tunnel vision 
in the pursuit of justice for one or more clients in a 
particular situation, but in the process, typically do not 
use any sort of “big picture” models, and thus may miss 
opportunities to effectuate change on a larger basis. 
The great social engineers of our time have 
engaged these five “movers,” consciously or otherwise, for 
as long as rights have existed. Charles Hamilton Houston, 
a chief architect of the legal desegregation movement, 
famously stated: 
 
A lawyer’s either a social engineer or . . . a 
parasite on society. . . . A social engineer [is] a 
highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive lawyer who 
[understands] the Constitution of the United 
States and [knows] how to explore its uses in 
                                               
this process: “[J]udges do and must legislate, but they can do so 
only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular 
motions.” S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). In Romer, Lawrence, and finally, 
Windsor, the Supreme Court has moved interstitially, as 
Holmes said it should, establishing the framework of cases from 
which district judges now draw wisdom and inspiration. Each 
of these small steps has led to this place and this time, where 
the right of same-sex spouses to the state-conferred benefits of 
marriage is virtually compelled. 
Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 557.  
124 See Arkles, supra note 52, at 612–13 (referring to various models for 
transformative social justice, most of which, it must be said, are at least as 
abstract as this one). 
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the solving of problems of local communities 
and in bettering conditions of the 
underprivileged citizens.125  
 
His ideas were reified by perhaps the greatest 
social engineer of the twentieth century: Justice Thurgood 
Marshall. Evan Wolfson, the founder of Freedom to 
Marry, is one of the more well-known and articulate 
champions of this holistic method of litigation. The 
attorneys of the Sylvia Rivera Law Project are among the 
leaders of the current legal movement for trans rights and 
are outspoken about the need for litigators to observe 
principles that are both interdisciplinary and 
intersectional.126 The modest idea advanced in this article 
is that lawyers—all of us—should use these movers 
consciously and deliberately.  
A practitioner who seeks to change a law in the 
manner described here should develop a plan to do so that 
involves more than just filing documents with a court. 
Such a plan should involve active coordination with the 
other four movers. The question should be asked: how can 
academics, the media, advocacy organizations, and 
activists play a role in this case? 
For example, vis-à-vis the activist community, a 
practitioner serves the important role of bridging; that is, 
connecting inherently insular groups with broader society 
and particularly with the institutions that have no reason 
to recognize them or their asserted rights. This can be a 
formidable challenge, because “[t]he stronger the identity 
and cohesion of the group, the more likely its members 
are to become alienated from other groups, and from 
society as a whole.”127 But “without strong external 
bridging, the group will become too insular and isolated to 
forge the kind of broad alliances that are essential to 
winning meaningful changes in society.”128 This isolation 
can be dangerous, and not just to the group itself.129 
                                               
125 OUR HISTORY, HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 
http://www.law.howard.edu/19 (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
126 See Arkles, supra note 52, passim.  
127 SMUCKER, supra note 53, at 96. 
128 Id. at 98. 
129 Smucker provides a number of anecdotes regarding the tendency of 
activist groups to “encapsulate”—that is, to “develop an ideology that is 
internally coherent but virtually unintelligible to recruits and outsiders who 
do not share all of the members’ assumptions”—often with disastrous results. 
See id. at 83, citing Frederick D. Miller, The End of SDS and the Emergence 
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Lawyers¾especially civil rights lawyers¾are tasked with 
disrupting the process of self-reinforcing insularity that 
tends to occur within grassroots groups and bringing the 
needs of these groups to the attention of power structures 
in safe, socially acceptable ways (such as litigation).130 
And perhaps more importantly, well-meaning lawyers 
who jump into litigation of rights without first hearing 
from a sufficient number of activists fighting for those 
rights may contravene the work of the larger movement 
in ways that they could not anticipate.131  
Indeed, while activists and those seeking to assert 
new rights may be “outsiders” in relation to governing 
power structures, lawyers are necessarily “insiders.” They 
are, in essence, constantly seeking to institutionalize 
ideas. The idea may be as simple as “my client is right 
and yours is wrong.” But when a judge puts that in an 
order, the idea becomes institutionalized. And the 
proposition that the sort of ideas we are responsible for 
institutionalizing can actually have an impact beyond 
one’s own clients should not be controversial. How are 
those ideas crafted? With careless, blunt-force litigation, 
or with purposefulness?132 
                                               
of the Weatherman: Demise through Success, in WAVES OF PROTEST: SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS SINCE THE SIXTIES, 307 (Jo Freeman & Victoria Johnson eds., 
1999). Ideally, “alternative narratives” will be “oriented to connect with 
broader bases of society” in order to combat encapsulation and ultimately to 
attain institutional acceptance. SMUCKER, supra note 53, at 85. 
130 See Arkles, supra note 52, at 602. “Lawyers often have an easier time 
getting meetings with decision makers precisely because we are seen as more 
‘reasonable,’ i.e., amenable to the status quo, and we are too often tempted to 
accept this access rather than insisting on solidarity with more radical 
leaders from affected communities.” The individual lawyer should be mindful 
of this, but there is no reason why solidarity with the oppressed must be 
mutually exclusive with institutional access. Indeed, providing access-by-
proxy to the oppressed is the civil rights lawyer’s raison d’etre. 
131 See id. at 597. “Lawyers acting on what they believe to be best for a 
marginalized community without taking leadership from that community will 
often fail to generate the most effective solutions and may actually propose 
counterproductive solutions.” 
132 See id. at 581–82. Arkles, et al., make a separate but important point 
about the need for lawyers and academics to involve grassroots activists. “If 
the problems faced by our communities are rooted in and enforced by the 
legal system, then meaningful change would have to come from outside of it.” 
Id. The authors note well-meaning participation in “roundtables, conferences, 
and law school symposia, where lawyers may identify, discuss, adopt, and 
pursue various strategies for advancing the rights of queer and trans people. 
However, all too often, these spaces exclude nonlawyers from participation 
and these spaces recreate the very forms of oppression we must dismantle to 
achieve social justice.” Id. 
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In addition, trench lawyers can (and should) do a 
lot more communicating with universities, when 
appropriate. Law schools often want to be members of the 
legal community in their own right, not just diploma 
mills. Litigators should help them do just that. Academics 
should make an effort to create content for practitioners 
that is both realistic in its scope and readily available, 
and practitioners must make an effort to use that content 
whenever possible. Citations to law or social-science 
journal articles are an unfortunate rarity in day-to-day 
practice. 133 
Similarly, organizations should not exclude 
individual litigators any more than litigators should 
discard broader organizational goals. A collaborative 
relationship between advocacy organizations (which tend 
to be micro-focused and short-staffed), and private 
lawyers (who tend to have more flexible resources and a 
diversified portfolio of social contacts), can be 
advantageous.  
Cultivating media contact is also something that is 
often overlooked, but vitally important in civil rights 
cases. The way in which a proponent of a right packages a 
message is often the way the media will present it. And 
the way in which it is presented may determine its 
success, at least in the short run.134 
                                               
133 The peculiar wall between academia and boots-on-the-ground lawyering is 
beyond the scope of this article, but its existence is widely acknowledged by 
academics and lawyers alike. See, e.g., the in-depth discussion of related 
issues in Transcript—Conference on the Ethics of Legal Scholarship, 101 
MARQ. L. REV. 1084, 1138 (2017) in which Professor Carissa Hessick states: “I 
actually think that there are some virtues of the law review model. And one 
of the virtues that I see is it allows us to have a format for work that should 
be of interest to a more general audience. To the extent that we do want 
lawyers or judges to pay attention to what we do, I think it is helpful to have 
that format. And I understand that it's contestable about whether we 
want lawyers and judges to pay attention to what we do.” (emphasis 
added). 
134 Of course, prudence counsels caution in using the media as a litigation 
tool. ABA Model Rule 3.6 states: 
A lawyer who is participating or has participated in 
the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not 
make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated 
by means of public communication and will have a 
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an 
adjudicative proceeding in the matter.  
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). An 
entire textbook could be written about what this rule means in the context of 
impact litigation. Suffice it to say that it is unlikely that a lawyer should 
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Regardless of where one fits into the big picture of 
furthering rights, it is critical to know the right problem 
solvers. The civil litigator should therefore forge 
relationships not just with activists, journalists, and 
organizational leaders, but also with criminal defense 
lawyers, domestic relations lawyers, and anyone else who 
has an up-close, daily audience with people whose rights 
are likely to be endangered. 
 
VII.  DO ONLY FOOLS RUSH IN? 
 
One final note: counterintuitively, in employing 
this model, there may be a certain danger in thinking too 
much about the big picture. Cole counsels that “cautious 
incrementalism” is “often essential” in approaching major 
changes to constitutional law.135 This is also a common 
sentiment among seasoned impact litigators. The fear of 
getting a bad ruling likely stems from the supposition 
that the courts should be on the vanguard of most issues, 
when in reality they are often the last stop.136 But an 
examination of history reveals that, while a degree of 
caution is obviously warranted, a premature pulling of the 
pin on the social grenade, at least in the judicial realm, 
                                               
need to say anything to the media aside from what appears in the public 
record, and if more need be said, a client may say it herself. 
135 COLE, supra note 31, at 43. 
136 Legislatures tend to be less progressive than the courts, but legislatures 
need not fit into this model at all, and need not be a point of comparison—
they are in many cases the very last place to recognize rights. In the opinion 
reversing the Kentucky district court in the marriage equality case, Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jeffrey Sutton framed the marriage case as “a 
debate about whether to allow the democratic processes begun in the States 
to continue in the four States of the Sixth Circuit or to end them now by 
requiring all States in the Circuit to extend the definition of marriage to 
encompass gay couples.” DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 396. 
Respectfully, from a constitutional and jurisprudential perspective, 
no court case involving individual rights is about “the democratic process.” 
Were it otherwise, our understanding of rights in the United States would be 
profoundly different. Take, for example, the referendum held in 2000—thirty-
three years after Loving v. Virginia—in which a full 40% of Alabama voters 
voted to retain the state constitution’s prohibition on interracial marriage.  
See Judith E. Schaeffer, Alabama Shows Why Civil Rights Shouldn’t Be Put 
to a Popular Vote, SLATE (June 12, 2015) https://slate.com/human-
interest/2015/06/gay-marriage-alabama-shows-why-civil-rights-shouldnt-be-
put-to-popular-vote.html. This sobering statistic underscores the importance 
of constitutional litigation apart from a purely democratic process; it is 
rendered even more confounding in light of the fact that the Alabama 
Supreme Court had unanimously held anti-miscegenation laws 
unconstitutional over a hundred years before Loving. See Burns v. State, 48 
Ala. 195 (Ala. 1872).  
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often does not cause as much destruction as one might 
fear.137 
Take, for example, the time between Bowers v. 
Hardwick in 1986, upholding sodomy laws, and Lawrence 
v. Texas in 2003, pronouncing such laws unconstitutional. 
This seventeen-year delay seems catastrophic at first 
glance, but progress on LGBT rights overall improved 
exponentially in the years after Bowers. This progress can 
even be seen at the Supreme Court level. Romer v. Evans, 
a decisive win for the LGBT community, held that states 
could not categorically prohibit legislation that protected 
people based on sexual orientation. This case was decided 
just ten years after Bowers.138  
By 2003, only four states had sodomy laws that 
applied only to persons of the same sex.139 Prosecutions 
under these laws were extremely rare. The ACLU 
acknowledges that “Lawrence v. Texas is one of a mere 
handful of cases since the American revolution involving 
two adults—straight or gay—actually prosecuted for 
being intimate in private.”140 Even the plaintiffs in 
Lawrence denied having engaged in the conduct they were 
prosecuted for, but “[s]ince Bowers, no other test case had 
emerged in which someone was actually arrested for 
violating a state sodomy law.”141 While undoubtedly 
helpful to LGBT rights overall, the victory in Lawrence 
was more symbolic than practical (as was the loss in 
Bowers). And the impact of this symbolic victory was 
strengthened by an explicit overruling—and sharp 
criticism—of Bowers by the Lawrence justices.142 
Consider the forty-three year span between Baker 
v. Nelson and Obergefell. Perhaps Baker was prematurely 
filed, but was it truly a setback for the LGBT movement? 
If so, it was so slight as to be of no consequence. Baker 
was not treated as serious precedent by the Court in the 
Obergefell opinion, nor in oral argument.143 Even if one 
                                               
137 See, e.g., Andrew Simmonds, Amah and Eved and the Origin of Legal 
Rights, 46 S.D. L. REV. 516, 517 (2001). Rights tend to develop “not out of 
lengthy progress or historical development, but rather from relatively brief, 
abrupt, discontinuous episodes. Not based upon plans, ideas or logic.” 
138 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
139 See Why Sodomy Laws Matter, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/why-
sodomy-laws-matter (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
140 Id. 
141 Lithwick, supra note 71.  
142 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
143 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
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were to imagine that Baker contained any meaningful 
constitutional analysis whatsoever, the difference in 
cultural norms would almost surely have led the Supreme 
Court to explicitly overrule it by 2015, as they had done 
with Bowers in Lawrence. It is far more likely that the 
news made by the Baker case contributed to the overall 
national conversation.144 It may be purely coincidence 
that the NGTF, Lambda Legal, and NCLR were all 
formed, and that the APA removed same-sex attraction as 
a mental illness, all almost immediately after Baker, but 
it seems more likely that there is at least some connection 
between these events.  
Looking to another era, the NAACP’s “block by 
block, precedent upon precedent” approach to 
desegregation in the first half of the twentieth century led 
to victory in Brown v. Board¾ but it was a close call.145 A 
bid for public school desegregation before the Supreme 
Court in the 1930s would surely have failed, but would 
this failure have set the movement back decades? If we 
are to draw any lessons from Bowers/Lawrence or 
Baker/Obergefell, it would seem not. And when the 
NAACP’s legal strategy began to be successfully 
implemented, Plessy v. Ferguson was not quite forty years 
old.146 In any event, “[t]he notion that Brown was the first 
case to consider the constitutionality of the segregation of 
public schools is, of course, fictitious. In many early cases 
the lawyers tried, perhaps ineptly, to argue that 
segregation was unconstitutional.”147 
On the other hand, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Goodridge, which was achieved through 
“cautious incrementalism,” resulted in immediate, 
                                               
144 In fact, Jack Baker is such an intelligent activist that he managed to keep 
national media coverage going for months after his unremarkable loss in the 
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Homosexual Wins Fight to Take Bar Examination 
in Minnesota, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 1973), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/07/archives/homosexual-wins-fight-to-take-
bar-examination-in-minnesota-marriage.html.  
145 Simmonds, supra note 137, at 610, 616. 
146 See id. at 610–11. 
147 Id. at 616. In a similar vein, “those cases or statutes that appear to result 
in extraordinary victories for marginalized groups typically translate into 
little positive change . . . scholars and activists have pointed out that despite 
the momentous legal victory of Brown v. Board of Education, 76 public 
schools remain segregated with white children receiving much more 
resources and higher quality education than black children.” Arkles, supra 
note 52, at 597 n.77. 
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observable backlash.148 This backlash was nationwide—
including in Kentucky—despite the fact that Goodridge 
only affected residents of Massachusetts. Forty-five states 
took steps to pronounce any union not between one man 
and one woman a nullity.149 Cole criticizes Hawaii’s Baehr 
v. Lewin opinion as an example of “taking too large a step 
[and resulting in] substantial negative repercussions,”150 
but it is difficult to see how those repercussions were any 
more negative than those suffered in the wake of 
Goodridge. 
Cole recognizes that “[i]n a long-term campaign for 
constitutional reform, losses can be as productive as 
victories.”151 Though he is referring primarily to ballot 
initiatives, the same can be said of losses in the courts. 
However, for whatever reason, activists often perceive the 
latter to be more disastrous than the former. For example, 
Cole discusses the trepidation in filing a challenge to 
Proposition 8 in the wake of the “painfully long” delay 
between Bowers and Lawrence.152 Of the Proposition 8 
                                               
148 COLE, supra note 31, at 49–51. 
149 See id. at 49. 
150 Id. at 43. 
151 Id. at 75. 
152 COLE, supra note 31, at 79. Cole discusses Professors Rosenberg and 
Klarman’s view that “the nationwide backlash that Goodridge sparked was 
‘nothing short of disastrous for the right to same-sex marriage.’” (citing 
Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong 
Places, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 795, 812 (2005); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow 
Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? U. OF CHI. PRESS, 343 (2008); 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE 105–106 (2013); John D’Emilio, The 
Marriage Fight is Setting Us Back, GAY & LESBIAN REV. WORLDWIDE 10 
(November-December 2006)). If one takes the position that such cases should 
not be litigated at all (and some do, see e.g., Rosenberg, supra) perhaps this 
makes sense. Otherwise, it is difficult to see the sense in decrying both losses 
and victories in the courts as counterproductive.  
It is perhaps worth noting, however, that a victory for marriage 
advocates may have been more disastrous than a loss had it come from the 
United States Supreme Court early on, as it may have spurred conservatives 
and centrists to more vigorous attempts at passage of a federal constitutional 
amendment defining marriage—something that was pushed by President 
George W. Bush and others in the early 2000s. See, e.g., David Stout, Bush 
Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2004), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/24/politics/bush-backs-ban-in-constitution-
on-gay-marriage.html. One could argue that this push was due in part to 
Goodridge, but still came to naught. To the contrary, Goodridge and 
Obergefell counsel Mary Bonauto “was confident [that if a victory could be 
won in court], people would see for themselves that there were no negative 
effects on families, local communities, or society more broadly, and the fear 
and opposition would dissipate.” COLE, supra note 32, at 45. She was right. 
Once the bell of a right like that of marriage has been rung in America, it is 
difficult to unring.  
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litigation which became Perry v. Schwarzenegger,153 Cole 
notes the following:  
 
No other federal suits were pending when 
[David] Boies and [Ted] Olson filed theirs. And 
while they could not guarantee that no one else 
would file, [organizational counsel] Wolfson, 
Bonauto, Coles, Davidson, and many others 
had repeatedly talked couples and lawyers out 
of filing when the time or place was not right. 
They felt that they could continue to do so. But 
they couldn’t dissuade Boies and Olson.154 
 
In other words, private lawyers pushed the movement 
forward even when the movement didn’t want to go. Until 
then, advocacy organizations “had been carefully pursuing 
an incremental state-by-state strategy, intentionally 
avoiding federal claims in order to keep the issue out of 
federal court” because only four states recognized same-
sex marriage.155  
Perry turned out for the best (as did Obergefell), but 
could it have led to disaster? Maybe, but given the solid 
reinforcement provided by our five movers over the 
decades elapsed since Baker, it seems unlikely. As Cole 
notes, “In retrospect, however, like Goodridge, the 
Proposition 8 loss was the catalyst that pushed marriage 
equality down the road[.]”156 Similarly, one could credibly 
argue that Perry—won or lost—might have moved the 
needle in favor of marriage equality. A critically 
important aspect of major operations, both electoral and 
judicial, appears to be not just that those operations are 
successful, but that they start the right kind of 
conversations, thus bringing about the cultural changes 
necessary to achieve institutional recognition. Social 
movement scholars appear to be generally in agreement 
on this point.157  
                                               
153 COLE, supra note 31, at 79. 
154 Id. at 60–61. 
155 Id.  
156 Id. at 59. 
157 Id. at 69; see also Megan S. Wright, End of Life and Autonomy: The Case 
for Relational Nudges in End-Of-Life Decision-Making Law and Policy, 77 
MD. L. REV. 1062, 1135 (2018). “And with regard to changing the culture of 
avoidance around death and dying, it is likely more feasible to change the 
structure—laws and policies—than to try to enact widespread cultural and 
psychological change. In fact, it is through changing the structure that 
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All this serves to underscore the fundamental 
difference between the goals of organizational litigators, 
and litigators who represent solely the interests of 
individual clients (the trench lawyers). The tension 
between the goals of organizations and the goals of trench 
lawyers can be helpful more often than harmful. Lawyers 
seeking justice for an individual client tend to be less 
cognizant of the fragility of social movements writ large; 
organizational lawyers tend to underestimate the 
strength and resilience of those same movements, in spite 
of (or even because of) judicial losses. This ostensible 
conflict often creates a powerful synthesis, as seen in 
Perry.158 
Consider also that litigation victories almost 
universally produce backlash. This is true whether the 
backlash is a result of a case won by incrementalism, like 
Goodridge, or by surprise, like Perry or Baehr. Especially 
in the case of Goodridge, the immediate effects of the 
                                               
cultural changes in this realm may become possible; that is, changing law 
and policy may normalize conversations about end of life, which may 
decrease avoidance of discussions of death and dying.” 
It should be noted that Maurice and Dominique probably did not 
expect to win their trial any more than Susan B. Anthony and Sojourner 
Truth did when they went to trial for illegal voting in 1872. United States v. 
Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (N.D.N.Y. 1873). As plainly evidenced by Anthony’s 
famous speech to the court at her sentencing, victory at trial was not the goal: 
“May it please the Court to remember that since the day of my arrest last 
November, this is the first time that either myself or any person of my 
disfranchised class has been allowed a word of defense before judge 
or jury.” See Remarks by Susan B. Anthony in the Circuit Court of the 
United States for the Northern District of New York, 19 June 1873, THE 
ELIZABETH CADY STANTON & SUSAN B. ANTHONY PAPERS PROJECT, 
http://ecssba.rutgers.edu/docs/sbatrial.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) 
(emphasis added). The opportunity to speak at length, to a larger audience in 
the context of a well-publicized case, about the injustice visited upon women 
in the nineteenth century, was rare indeed. Anthony seized that opportunity, 
even when there was no realistic hope of a verdict in her favor. 
158 Arkles, supra note 52, at 597 (noting that “[a]s parties in a lawsuit, 
individuals or small groups do not have the same opportunities they have in 
community organizing to share and learn from other people’s experiences, 
build political analysis, and develop solutions dynamically with others from 
their community”). This is undoubtedly true, but may not necessarily be all 
bad. Many of the plaintiffs in Obergefell had not been involved in LGBT 
activism at all, at least not in any formal way. The same is true of the 
plaintiffs in Lawrence. These litigants lacked the political savvy of movement 
work veterans, but also the prejudices and preconceptions that can also come 
with that work. We should, of course, not deign to know what is right or 
wrong for the community or movements as a whole, but an individual 
lawyer’s first duty is to her client, and working with an individual client to 
solve a problem can provide a microfocus on aspects of that problem which 
are often missed by larger organizations (as noted by the activist-scholars). 
Id.   
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backlash from an incremental win would seem to be worse 
than, or at least on a par with, the consequences of a loss. 
And like losses, as Cole observes, “backlash can be 
productive.”159 Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, it is 
not clear that cautious incrementalism in civil rights 
litigation has affected the development of rights any more 
or less than rushing into battle. To avoid litigation on the 
basis of fear of backlash, therefore, may only serve to 
delay justice. This is especially so today (as opposed to 
100 years ago) when one accounts for the increased pace 
of communication, and therefore the increased pace at 
which rights are recognized. In the era of Brown or Baker, 
it could take days for word of a loss to spread; now it 
takes only seconds, and seconds more for activists to 
mobilize in response.160  
Indeed, for those on the farthest fringes, the only 
way to stoke the fire of a would-be right may be to assert 
that right in a court of law and lose. The media, the 
legislature, the executive branch, advocacy 
organizations—none of these are obligated to hear the 
grievances of an individual or a group who seek to 
establish a new right. The courts, however, are built for 
just such a purpose. Even a curt, dismissive decision like 
the one in Baker starts conversations that would not 
likely occur otherwise.161  
  Still, it must be acknowledged that there is a 
serious danger in presenting a bad narrative which could 
further reinforce stereotypes or otherwise sway public 
                                               
159 COLE, supra note 31, at 50; see also Jonathan Capehart, Gays And 
Lesbians Owe Thanks to President George W. Bush and Justice Scalia, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
partisan/wp/2014/10/20/gays-and-lesbians-owe-thanks-to-president-george-w-
bush-and-justice-scali+a/?utm_term=.7779eae1bb00 (“By attempting to ban 
gay marriage, the president sparked public debate about marriage equality 
that ignited a historic backlash.”). 
160 See, e.g., Nereida Moreno, Activists Create Websites to Track Anti-Trump 
Events in Chicago, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 13, 2017), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-protest-websites-met-
20170312-story.html; Samuel Plank, Tweeting Protest: Organization and 
Mobilization in the New Administration, HARV. POL. REV. (July 24, 2017), 
http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/tweeting-protest-organization-and-
mobilization-in-the-new-administration/.  
161 Arkles, supra note 52, at 615 (using the example of a trans prisoner 
bringing a lawsuit against prison staff). “Even realizing the litigation 
outcome will probably be unfavorable to her, she may still develop leadership 
skills by rallying a broader community of people impacted by similar issues. 
Additionally, she may use the knowledge and energy gained through the 
lawsuit to change policy.” Although victory is nice, these can all be legitimate 
and powerful objectives for litigation. 
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opinion against the underlying cause. Marriage litigation 
teams have been gently (and perhaps rightly) criticized 
for “the heteronormative and traditional characteristics 
present in the carefully curated set of Obergefell 
plaintiffs” because “respecting individual choice in those 
we love[] will require challenging mainstream norms 
themselves rather than simply imitating existing 
models.”162 But caution in the content of the narrative 
presented to the public and to the courts is different from 
an incremental approach to when and where that 
narrative is told, when it comes to long-term success in 
vindicating a right. As one activist-scholar writes,  
 
A group engaged in challenging entrenched 
power . . . has to contend with far more powerful 
opponents in incredibly lopsided political 
contests. Such a group, therefore, has not only 
to foster a strong internal identity; it also has 
to win allies beyond the bounds of that identity, 
if it is to build the collective power it needs to 
move any serious political goals forward.163 
 
This is precisely why lawyers should engage themselves 
with bridging activist communities to power structures 
and ensuring that broadly relatable client narratives are 
crafted. “When our subcultures become too self-referential 
and incoherent to outsiders, then our words and actions 
may come to function as repellants to others—even to our 
allies and people who agree with us on the issues.”164 The 
point at which litigation is most likely to succeed is the 
point at which advocates may “credibly claim that our 
[clients’] values are popular—even that they are common 
sense—and connected to a substantial social base.”165 A 
relatable, “common sense” narrative can and should be 
shouted as loudly and as often as possible.166  
                                               
162 Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J.F. 136 (2015), 
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/perfect-plaintiffs.  
163 SMUCKER, supra note 53, at 63.  
164 Id. at 56. 
165 Id. at 38 (emphasis in original). 
166 See, e.g., Binny Miller, Give them Back their Lives: Recognizing Client 
Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 487 (1994); Benjamin L. Apt, 
Aggadah, Legal Narrative, and the Law, 73 OR. L. REV. 943 (1994). 
Of course, exceptions to this rule abound. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick’s 
discussion of the circumstances leading to the Lawrence decision: “An 
interracial, lower-middle-to-lower-class pair hooking up in a seedy apartment 
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 Volumes could be written about the relative merits 
of incrementalism versus “rushing in,” but the limited 
point of this section is to suggest that these considerations 
should not figure heavily into an individual practitioner’s 
decision as to whether or not to assert a “new” right on 
behalf of a client. For this strategy to be consciously 
employed and to be effective, some losses are to be 
expected in the courts. Every movement in American 
history has lost critical, right-defining court cases—often 
more than a few. The question: what can an effective 
advocate make of those losses? The answer: a relatable, 
popular narrative about their clients and their rights that 
can be told over and over. Examples below illustrate this 
principle. 
 
VIII.  CURRENT EXAMPLES  
 
Each of these examples is a right that is not yet 
fully realized but is in stage two of development per the 
model above (that is, it has achieved some, but not total, 
institutional recognition). These emerging rights could be 
purposefully advanced using this model.  
 
1.  Healthcare as a Right 
 
The discussion of healthcare as a “right” in the 
United States is in its infancy but is quickly gathering 
steam.167 This discussion, which started with grassroots 
activists, may be seen as a direct response to social factors 
that have resulted in the exclusion of millions of people 
from receiving meaningful treatment without the threat 
of financial ruin. The right is finally ripening, and lawyers 
can assist in the process.  
The idea of healthcare as a right is not a new one, 
at least not outside the United States. The 1946 World 
Health Organization constitution states that “the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is 
one of the fundamental rights of every human being 
                                               
in a marginal neighborhood: Lawrence and Garner were hardly a civil-rights 
litigator’s dream plaintiffs. They were not the type to tug at judicial 
heartstrings. But advocates for gay rights couldn’t afford to shop around for a 
perfect plaintiff.” Lithwick, supra note 71.  
167 Addy Baird, Single-Payer Health Care is Gaining Steam. These Are the 
People Who Made it Possible. THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://thinkprogress.org/single-payer-political-moment-c4e0139244b1/.  
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without distinction of race, religion, political belief, 
economic or social condition.”168 The European Union and 
the United Nations both recognize health care as a basic 
human right, and as of 2015, 38% of United Nations’ 
member constitutions guaranteed medical care.169 It is 
difficult to explain how this right has flourished for so 
long in much of the rest of the world, but is just now in 
the initial stages of recognition here.  
However, as with marriage, there are “movers” that 
formerly worked against the idea of healthcare as a right 
and are now beginning to reverse course. For example, the 
American Medical Association (AMA) argued against any 
government intervention in healthcare at all until the 
advent of Medicare/Medicaid in 1965.170 Similarly, the 
AMA opposed systemic changes proposed by the Clinton 
administration in the 1990s. However, it made a 
noticeable shift in 2009 by supporting the original version 
of the Affordable Care Act—including the addition of a 
public option to insurance exchanges.171 While the AMA 
does not yet support healthcare as a right, other 
prominent physician-led organizations do.172  
 In the 2010s, spurred by the ACA debate and 
countless stories of personal tragedy, the media has just 
begun to weigh in on this subject in earnest.173 Right on 
schedule, the first light of formal institutional recognition 
can now be seen. Massachusetts passed sweeping 
statewide reforms intended to provide health insurance to 
                                               
168 Julia Kaufman, Health Care is a Right, Not a Privilege, THE KENAN 
INSTITUTE FOR ETHICS, 
https://archive.kenan.ethics.duke.edu/humanrights/snowball/health-care-is-a-
right-not-a-privilege/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).  
169 G. H. Jones & H. Kantarjian, Health Care in the United States—Basic 
Human Right or Entitlement?, 26 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY, 2193 [needs start 
page] (2015), https://academic.oup.com/annonc/article/26/10/2193/144592 
(citing Jody Heymann, Constitutional Rights to Health, Public Health and 
Medical Care: The Status of Health Protections in 191 Countries, 639 [needs 
pincite] (July 4, 2013), 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17441692.2013.810765 (last 
visited May 27, 2015)). 
170 Kyle B. Jones, It’s Time to Recognize Health Care as a Right, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-
history/wp/2018/01/17/its-time-to-recognize-health-care-as-a-
right/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.17a671f1110f.  
171 Id. 
172 A notable example is Physicians for a National Health Program, which 
“has more than 20,000 members and chapters across the United States.” 
About PNPH, PHPH, http://pnhp.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). 
173 See Atul Gawande, Is Health Care a Right?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/02/is-health-care-a-right.  
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every resident of the state in 2006.174 As early as 2008, 
then-candidate Obama said that he believed healthcare 
“should be a right for every American.”175 In June of 2017, 
the Nevada legislature passed a bill that would have 
allowed residents to buy into the state’s Medicaid plan, 
but the bill was vetoed by the Governor.176 Around the 
same time, a statewide public “single-payer” healthcare 
system was nearly enacted in California.177 In the last two 
years, support for a single-payer system has shot up 
dramatically; a poll showed that 51% of Americans 
support such a system as of April 2018,178 up from 33% in 
a similar poll conducted a year earlier.179 
Healthcare writ large has not been recognized as a 
right by any American court, but it may only be a matter 
of time. Litigators have lost on this issue thus far, but 
such losses are not uncommon in the development of a 
right.180 And as with marriage, stepping-stone victories 
may be within reach in the realm of healthcare-oriented 
rights.181 For example, a handful of attorneys have 
                                               
174 Mitt Romney, My Plan for Massachusetts Health Insurance Reform, BOS. 
GLOBE (Nov. 24, 2004), https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-
wellness/2004/11/24/plan-for-massachusetts-health-insurance-
reform/d1I1xFpnfLcQ8Ipz4nCdpJ/story.html.  
175 Transcript of Second McCain, Obama Debate, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 7, 2008, 
11:34 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/07/presidential.debate.transcript/.  
176 Gawande, supra note 173. 
177 Clio Chang, What Killed Single-Payer In California? NEW REPUBLIC (June 
30, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/143650/killed-single-payer-
california. “If single-payer can’t pass with Democratic super-majorities in the 
Golden State, that raises serious questions about any national effort.” Id. The 
author notes that this sentiment is analogous to the question of how national 
marriage equality was possible in the wake of California’s vote on Prop 8. Id.  
178 Jessie Hellmann, Poll: Slim Majority of Americans Support Single-Payer 
Health Care, HILL (Apr. 13, 2018), 
http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/383015-poll-slim-majority-of-americans-
support-single-payer-health-care.  
179 Jocelyn Kiley, Public Support for ‘Single Payer’ Health Coverage Grows, 
Driven by Democrats, PEW RES. CTR. (June 23, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/23/public-support-for-single-
payer-health-coverage-grows-driven-by-democrats/.  
180 See Gregory D. Curfman, King v. Burwell and a Right to Health Care, 
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20150626.048913/full/. “The 
Court’s opinion in King v. Burwell, validating the subsidies provided on the 
federal health insurance exchange, lends clear support for a right to health 
care.” Id. But nonetheless, “the halting approach to declaring a universal 
right to health care for all Americans has continued in the Supreme Court.” 
Id. 
181 Indeed, some victories have already been won on discrete aspects of 
healthcare. The right to emergency care, the right to abortion, the right to 
language access in healthcare, the right to die with dignity—these are all 
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tackled outlandish hospital bills by seeking to have them 
declared unconscionable, either under common-law 
contract theories or consumer protection statutes. More 
than a decade ago, Lehigh University professor George A. 
Nation, III set forth the differences between procedural 
and substantive unconscionability, arriving at the 
conclusion that both can apply to hospital billing:  
 
The overriding factor . . . in finding hospital 
admission contracts procedurally 
unconscionable is that urgent medical services 
are necessities, and time is virtually always 
important. Thus, even if a patient understands 
the terms in the hospital admission contract 
and decides he does not want to agree to them, 
he is in no position to shop for an alternative 
supplier of urgently needed medical services. 
The patient must agree to the terms the 
hospital offers, because the patient requires the 
services. . . .Some courts have found that an 
excessive markup results in substantive 
unconscionability. [I]n one case expert 
testimony was given that the hospital’s “full” or 
“published” charges for 1995 and 1996 were 
about 300% of the hospital’s costs. . . . More 
recently, the national average full-charge rate 
was about 345% of costs.182 
  
These theories are slowly finding their way into the 
courts. In 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals published 
the outcome of a failed attempt at an unconscionability 
argument in a case called Banner Health v. Medical 
Savings Insurance Co.183 Indeed, thus far, most offensive 
                                               
salient examples of rights affecting healthcare that did not exist 100 years 
ago. See Lily Lo, The Right to Understand Your Doctor: Protecting Language 
Access Rights in Healthcare, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 377, 381 (2011); 
Yvonne Lindgren, From Rights to Dignity: Drawing Lessons from Aid in 
Dying and Reproductive Rights, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 779, 780 (2016). 
182 George A. Nation, III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of 
Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L.J. 101, 
112, 114, 118 (2005). 
183 163 P.3d 1096 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
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litigation based on this theory appears to have failed. But 
that is not to say that an unconscionability defense (or 
even a cause of action) could not succeed under the right 
circumstances.184 The lengthy, well-reasoned dissent in 
Banner Health is telling: 
 
In opposition to Banner’s motion for summary 
judgment, MSIC and the patients argued the 
price terms of the COAs185 were 
unconscionable. In support of this argument, 
the patients or their representatives who 
signed the COAs presented affidavits stating 
that they signed the COAs in emergency 
situations, while they were under stress caused 
by their medical conditions or the medical 
conditions of their dependents. Several of the 
patients stated in their affidavits that the 
COAs were not explained to them by the 
hospital personnel when they signed them, and 
that they believed that signing the COAs was a 
prerequisite to treatment. Furthermore, MSIC 
submitted the deposition of Banner’s Vice 
President of Finance, indicating that the cost-
to-charge ratio for some medical treatments at 
Banner hospitals was as low as 19.77%. These 
facts raise at least the specter of 
unconscionability as to the price terms in the 
COAs.186 
  
Additionally, some states have consumer protection acts 
that cover unconscionable hospital billing, and these suits 
seem to fare better than those relying on common law 
contract principles. In Via Christi Regional Medical 
                                               
184 For a promising start which resulted in abject disappointment, see the 
tortured history of Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. 
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Center, Inc. v. Reed,187 the Kansas Supreme Court 
reversed the determination by the lower court judge on 
unconscionability. “The judge said that Reed sought ‘to 
attack the healthcare system’ and that ‘there is virtual 
universal agreement [that] it is in need of repair’ but 
ruled that the actions of Via Christi were not 
unconscionable.”188 Nonetheless, the court held, “a 
hospital may engage in unconscionable conduct prohibited 
by the Kansas Consumer Protection Act when (1) it files 
and pursues enforcement of a lien based upon a bill 
inaccurate because of overcharges or duplicate charges, 
and (2) the hospital has enjoyed superior bargaining 
power when compared to its patient.”189 These holdings 
sow the seeds of what could ultimately put an end to 
health care usury and ultimately help shape a judicially 
recognized right to healthcare. 
 
2. The Right to Use Cannabis 
 
The idea of the right to cannabis usage has existed 
in one form or another for decades, usually under the 
umbrella of privacy rights or broader libertarian concepts. 
But it is medicinal usage that has gradually put a 
spotlight on cannabis rights over the last forty years.190 
Here one can see institutional recognition at a further 
stage of development than healthcare, one akin to the 
recognitional limbo that marriage equality was in in the 
mid-to-late 2000s. In fact, California voters authorized 
use of medical cannabis by referendum back in 1996, 
making it the pioneering state on medical cannabis 
around the same time that Baehr v. Lewin was decided in 
Hawaii; a similar trajectory may be observed between 
these two issues since then.191 Today, thirty-three states 
and the District of Columbia all formally make allowances 
of some kind for medical cannabis use.192  
                                               
187 314 P.3d 852, 859 (Kan. 2013). 
188 Id. at 859.  
189 Id. at 868. 
190 Scott C. Martin, A Brief History of Marijuana Law in America, TIME (Apr. 
20, 2016), http://time.com/4298038/marijuana-history-in-america/.  
191 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2001). 
192 Francis J. Mootz III, Ethical Cannabis Lawyering in California, 9 ST. 
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Meanwhile, the U.S. government’s enforcement of 
federal anti-cannabis provisions is, in itself, emblematic of 
institutional struggle to recognize a right. While the 
federal government has continued to insist that cannabis 
remain a Schedule I narcotic, the Obama administration 
issued a memorandum in late 2009 declaring that U.S. 
attorneys “should not focus federal resources in your 
states on individuals whose actions are in clear and 
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws 
providing for the medical use of marijuana . . . .”193 The 
Trump administration, however, rescinded that 
memorandum and the Obama-era laxity regarding 
cannabis enforcement, “although it is unclear whether 
[Trump] will deploy the assets of the Justice Department 
to prosecute persons for activity that conforms to state-
legal cannabis programs.”194  
Court cases on marijuana rights have had mixed 
results, but have not been universally anti-cannabis. An 
anomalous opinion from the Alaska Supreme Court 
effectively legalized small amounts of recreational 
marijuana in 1975.195 But even a half-century later, 
states’ rights arguments held little sway with the United 
States Supreme Court, as evidenced by cannabis users’ 
successive (and decisive) defeats in United States v. 
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative196 and Gonzales v. 
Raich.197 Both of these decisions held that California’s 
medical marijuana provisions could not trump the federal 
Controlled Substances Act.198 Since those decisions, 
however, courts and legal scholars are discussing the 
jurisprudence of cannabis usage more frequently, often 
under a theory of established rights such as due process 
or unique state constitutional provisions.199  
While many courts and the federal executive 
branch remain stuck in limbo, the development of 
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cannabis rights continues full steam ahead on the ground. 
Since the Oakland Cannabis decision in 2001, public 
support for recreational marijuana legalization has nearly 
doubled.200 Some polls have public support for medical 
marijuana at a staggering 99%.201 This is not just in 
states considered more progressive; Florida recently 
added a provision for medical cannabis to its state 
constitution, and Oklahoma recently became the 
fourteenth state to allow medicinal use by a voter-
initiated measure.202 More states now allow medical 
cannabis than those that prohibit it—a state of 
equilibrium that did not exist for very long in the case of 
marriage equality before total institutional recognition As 
with marriage, ballot initiatives for recreational—or 
“responsible”—use of cannabises are underway in 
numerous states and have already been successful in 
some, including California.203  
In short, cannabis rights are on the verge of total 
institutional recognition; a lawyer adeptly coordinating 
these five movers could help accelerate the process.  
 
3.  The Death Penalty 
 
Capital punishment in America is also likely on the 
cusp of dramatic change. In 2014, a federal judge struck 
down California’s death penalty.204 In the first two pages 
of the opinion, Judge Cormac J. Carney, a George W. 
Bush appointee, summarized his reasoning:  
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[S]ystemic delay has made . . . execution so 
unlikely that the death sentence carefully and 
deliberately imposed by the jury has been 
quietly transformed into one no rational jury or 
legislature could ever impose: life in prison, 
with the remote possibility of death. As for the 
random few for whom execution does become a 
reality, they will have languished for so long on 
death row that their execution will serve no 
retributive or deterrent purpose and will be 
arbitrary.205 
 
Carney’s ruling was ultimately overturned,206 but 
California has not executed a prisoner in twelve years, 
and the legal landscape of the death penalty is changing 
in a way that can be compared to the development of the 
other rights discussed above.  
 As with the right to healthcare, the United States 
lags decades behind most of the rest of the world when it 
comes to capital punishment.207 The only industrialized 
nations left that retain the death penalty are Singapore, 
Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S.208  
Furthermore, institutional recognition that 
individuals may demand their government refrain from 
putting them to death is not new, even here in the United 
States. A nationwide moratorium was imposed by the 
Supreme Court in 1972, butwas lifted in 1976.209 “Since 
then, one branch or another of government in several 
states has done away with the death penalty.”210 
“Currently, 32 states are referred to as ‘retentionist’ (that 
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is, they retain the use of capital punishment).”211 Carney’s 
ruling is based in part on Justice Brennan’s concurring 
opinion in the 1972 case that put the death penalty on 
hold. Brennan wrote: “When the punishment of death is 
inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is 
legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable 
that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of 
little more than a lottery system.”212 Since the 
reinstatement of capital punishment the following year,213 
the categories of people to whom that punishment may be 
applied have been steadily reduced by judicial fiat. 214 In 
Kentucky alone, the last two years have yielded decisions 
demanding more exacting science in competency 
determinations, and abolishing capital punishment 
altogether for everyone under twenty-one at the time of 
the crime.215 
But the deadest giveaway that this right may soon 
advance from stage two to stage three comes from Justice 
Breyer who, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote the 
following in 2015: “[R]ather than try to patch up the 
death penalty’s legal wounds one at a time, I would ask 
for full briefing on a more basic question: whether the 
death penalty violates the Constitution. . . . [T]he death 
penalty, in and of itself, now likely constitutes a legally 
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prohibited ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t].’”216 Breyer, 
in essence, asked to be given the right case. 
This shift in judicial attitudes about capital 
punishment can be explained by reference to our movers. 
The media, covering activists and organizations like the 
Innocence Project, along with a vast body of research by 
academics suggesting that the death penalty does no 
practical good for anyone,217 have helped to change the 
public’s view of the death penalty dramatically since the 
1970s.218 Take, for example, the incredible number of 
ghastly mishaps associated with lethal injection. Accounts 
of executions taking hours because officials could not find 
a vein, or administered the drugs incorrectly, or because 
the condemned person simply would not die properly, 
have been prominent in the news for years now.219 The 
last few years have seen an upswing in these horror 
stories due to states using “experimental” drugs, which, 
for obvious reasons, have not been approved, tested, or 
even evaluated by any self-respecting medical 
professional.220 Then there are the exonerations to 
contend with: 150 people have been released from death 
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row since 1973 upon proof of actual innocence.221 These 
exonerations often occurred after the inmate had 
exhausted the lengthy appeals process.222 DNA evidence 
swoops in to save the day just before a prisoner’s last 
meal,223 an eyewitness recants decades later,224 the real 
killer confesses, etc. Innocent people have undoubtedly 
been killed by the state: people who did not have the 
benefit of DNA evidence, or a competent lawyer, an 
unbiased jury, or—again—just dumb luck.225 A growing 
public awareness of this inescapable conclusion is finally 
undermining the integrity of the American death penalty. 
This is evidenced by recent polls demonstrating that for 
the first time, less than 50% of the American public 
believes that capital punishment is applied fairly,226 and 
opposition to the practice overall was at an all-time low in 
2017.227   
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
 
The above model may serve as a starting point for 
practitioners grappling with the reality of emerging rights 
in the twenty-first century. Rights will continue to come 
into being at stage one of this model with or without 
involvement by the bar, but it is the movement from 
partial institutional recognition (stage two) to total 
institutional recognition (stage three) that an individual 
practitioner should be most keenly focused on. Given the 
increasing pace at which new rights achieve institutional 
recognition, a “wait-and-see” attitude makes little sense 
with regard to whether to pursue litigation; rather, a 
lawyer should be mindful of what the proper narrative 
should be for a client who seeks to vindicate a right that is 
not yet wholly recognized, and what vehicles may be used 
to help further the client’s cause—both in the context of 
litigation and in the broader context of a social movement 
overall. Those vehicles may be conceptualized as the five 
“movers” described herein. A conscious, deliberate choice 
by a practitioner to incorporate these movers into what 
might otherwise by a myopic, traditional litigation 
strategy is more likely to produce durable and desirable 
outcomes for a client.     
 
 
